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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
JONATHAN L. HAFETZ
The events of September 11, 2001 have significantly redefined the
boundary between liberty and national security in American law and society.
As part of its "war against terrorism," the federal government, led by the
President, has attempted to find those responsible for the September 11 at-
tacks and protect the country against future terrorist attacks. In the process, it
has sought unprecedented power to detain and deport noncitizens,' broaden
the definition of "terrorist activity,"' conduct physical searches and wiretaps
of suspected terrorists,3 subject Arab and Muslim men to ethnic profiling by
law enforcement authorities,4 require certain immigrants from Arab and
Muslim countries to undergo a "special registration" process,5 and seize and
detain indefinitely individuals in the United States whom the President has
designated as "enemy combatants. 6
Immigrants have been the primary target of the new erosion of civil lib-
erties. While the terrorist attacks of September 11 were themselves unprece-
John J. Gibbons Fellow in Public Interest and Constitutional Law, Gibbons, Del Deo,
Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione. J.D., 1999, Yale Law School; M. Phil., 1992, Oxford Univer-
sity.
1. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 960-66 (2002) (discussing mass
preventive detention of aliens by the government).
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411,
115 Stat. 272, 345-50 (2001).
3. Id. § 218 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B) & 1823(a)(7)(B) (2001)) (eliminating
the requirement under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that wiretaps and physical
searches authorized without a showing of probable cause nonetheless be for the primary pur-
pose of foreign intelligence, not criminal law enforcement).
4. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Critical Race Studies: The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA
L. REv. 1575, 1578 (2002) ("The U.S. Department of Justice has also engaged in racial profil-
ing in what has been described as a dragnet-seeking to conduct more than five thousand in-
vestigatory interviews of male noncitizens between the ages of eighteen and thirty-three from
'Middle Eastern' or 'Islamic' countries or countries with some suspected tie to Al Qaeda, who
sought entry into the country since January 1, 2000, on tourist, student, and business visas.").
5. See Rachel L. Swarns, Thousands of Arabs and Muslims Could Be Deported, Officials
Say, N.Y. TmEs, June 7, 2003, at A9.
6. See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
1353 (2004).
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dented, the subsequent backlash reflects a familiar pattern of targeting im-
migrants during times of war and crisis. This article focuses on one of the
first and most prominent aspects of the backlash: the attempt to close depor-
tation hearings to the press and public in cases the government has desig-
nated as "special interest."
Following the attacks of September 11, hundreds of individuals were ar-
rested and detained on immigration violations; many were subsequently
placed in deportation proceedings." The Department of Justice imposed
heightened security measures on noncitizens it believed had a close connec-
tion to Al Qaeda or a related terrorist organization. Less than two weeks af-
ter the attacks, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a memoran-
dum, known as the "Creppy Directive," requiring immigration judges to
close the courtroom in deportation proceedings in "special interest" cases,
including to visitors, family, and the press.8 Under the directive, an immigra-
tion court could not even communicate whether a particular case was on the
docket or scheduled for a hearing.' The directive thus imposed a complete
blackout on any information about an entire category of deportation proceed-
ings. By the government's own admission, as of April 2003, 766 detainees
had been designated as "special interest" cases, 611 of whom had closed de-
portation hearings under the Creppy Directive and 505 of whom had already
been deported."0
Upon uncovering the existence of secret deportation hearings-a proc-
ess that took months-media organizations filed suit to gain access to the
hearings under the First Amendment." While the plaintiffs readily acknowl-
edged that national security concerns might dictate closure in individual in-
stances, they insisted that such determinations had to be made by immigra-
tion judges on a case-by-case basis based on particularized findings. 2
District courts in Michigan and New Jersey enjoined enforcement of the
Creppy Directive. 3 In Michigan, the injunction applied to a particular indi-
7. See Swains, supra note 5.
8. Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, to All Immigration
Judges (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://archive.aclu.org/court/creppy-imemo.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 25, 2004).
9. Id.
10. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, North Jer-
sey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215
(2003).
11. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002); Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The First Amendment pro-
vides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
12. See Reply Brief for Petitioner in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, North
Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
2215 (2003).
13. North Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 305; Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp.
2d at 948.
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vidual;"4 in New Jersey, the injunction entered was nationwide." Both orders
were appealed, and the district court's nationwide injunction was stayed
pending appeal. In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft," the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling that the Creppy Directive vio-
lated the public's First Amendment right to attend deportation proceedings."
However, in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 8 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and reversed
the district court's decision. 9
In opposing plaintiffs' attempt to seek review from the Supreme Court,
the government claimed that the closure policy was likely to be revised and
that there remained few, if any, individuals whose deportation hearings
could conceivably be closed under the Creppy Directive." Despite a direct
circuit split on a historically important issue, the Court denied certiorari."'
While the government has essentially abandoned its use of the Creppy
Directive, the cases nonetheless raise significant issues in terms not only of
the government's treatment of the September 11 detainees, but also First
Amendment access rights in administrative proceedings generally.
Both circuit courts addressed the right of access issue under the Su-
preme Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,' which
recognized a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials.23 Under the so-
called "logic" and "experience" test set forth in Richmond Newspapers and
its progeny," a court must decide: whether the particular proceeding has
"historically been open to the press and general public;" and whether "public
access play[s] a significant positive role in the functioning" of that proceed-
ing. Assuming both prongs have been met, access cannot be denied absent
a showing that it is "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.216
14. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
15. North Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
16. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
17. Id. at711.
18. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
19. Id. at 221.
20. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, North Jer-
sey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215
(2003).
21. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
2215 (2003).
22. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
23. Id. at 580.
24. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise IF'); Press-
Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise "); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Although the basis of the test was outlined in Jus-
tice Brennan's concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, it was not formally employed by
the Court until Press-Enterprise I.
25. Press-Enterprise I, 478 U.S. at 8.
26. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07. 3
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This article explains why a constitutional right of access to deportation
hearings is necessary to safeguard the First Amendment's structural role of
ensuring the informed public debate essential to representative self-
government and protecting against abuse of power by public officials. This
article describes how these broader goals underlie the Court's decision in
Richmond Newspapers and later right of access cases. It also cautions
against an overly rigid application of Richmond Newspapers' "logic" and
"experience" test, particularly the "experience" prong's purported require-
ment of a lengthy historical tradition of access to the proceeding in question.
The article suggests how other, broader historical narratives, particularly the
mistreatment of immigrants during times of crisis, may be more closely re-
lated to the First Amendment's underlying structural goals than the fact of a
tradition of access itself. Finally, the article underscores why extending a
constitutional right of access to deportation hearings would be consistent
with the government's concern about opening all administrative proceedings
and actions to the public. Although the closed hearings of the September 11
immigration detainees has faded, the legality of the hearings was never con-
clusively settled, and the potential for further closed hearings remains, espe-
cially in the wake of another terrorist attack.
Part I briefly summarizes the important doctrinal developments during
the period preceding the Supreme Court's decision in Richmond Newspa-
pers, noting how the Court sought to balance the role of public access in
promoting core democratic values like informed self-government with con-
cerns about opening all government operations and records to the public un-
der the First Amendment. This Part examines the Court's rejection of claims
of a general public "right to know" and of a newsgathering privilege for the
press. Yet, it also describes the Court's resistance to restrictions on access to
or discussion about criminal trials, even when imposed by lower courts to
protect a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial amid seemingly preju-
dicial publicity.
Part II describes the Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers and
tracks the emergence of the so-called "logic" and "experience" test in subse-
quent right of access cases. It describes how the Court's understanding of the
First Amendment's structural role influenced these decisions. It also exam-
ines how Richmond Newspapers marked an important expansion of First
Amendment doctrine by transcending the traditional-and problematic-
distinction between the dissemination and/or receipt of information, which
was protected under the First Amendment, and access to public information,
which was not.
Part III examines the decisions by the Third and Sixth Circuits and their
application of the "logic" and "experience" test in determining whether there
is a constitutional right of access to deportation proceedings.
Part IV sets forth the basis of a constitutional right of access to deporta-
tion proceedings based on Richmond Newspapers and the First Amend-
ment's role in the country's political system. It outlines the structural argu-
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ments favoring access, including ensuring the informed public debate so vi-
tal to a democratic society; checking the abuse of power by public officials;
and countering the government's extensive, yet constitutionally limited
power over immigration. It then describes how this understanding of the
First Amendment overlaps with the "logic" and "experience" test that devel-
oped in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny. It also discusses the prob-
lems with a mechanical application of Richmond Newspapers' two-pronged
test, particularly the history prong, and suggests other ways of viewing his-
tory that relate more closely to the structural goals underlying access rights.
Finally, this Part outlines limiting principles that justify a structural-based
right of access to deportation hearings under Richmond Newspapers, while
avoiding a potentially limitless expansion of claims of access to other gov-
ernment information or proceedings.
I. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS BEFORE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS
In the years preceding its decision in Richmond Newspapers, the Court
resisted efforts by media organizations and others to establish a broad right
of access under the First Amendment to government information, records,
and operations. While the Court acknowledged the First Amendment's
broader purpose of promoting informed public debate in decisions such as
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,2 it hewed to a vision of the First Amendment that
protected against government restrictions on speech but did not secure a
right of access to government information, records, or operations. The Court
was influenced by separation of powers principles and prudential concerns
about the absence of limits on any such right of access. None of these cases,
however, involved access to formal, adjudicatory proceedings, as Richmond
Newspapers would.
At the same time, the Court assessed the constitutionality of various re-
strictions on criminal court proceedings. In each instance, the Court affirmed
the open nature of the proceedings under the First Amendment, suggesting
that a constitutional right of access to adjudicatory proceedings presented
different if not unique issues than access to government information facili-
ties.
This Part describes the pre-Richmond Newspapers right of access cases
and the restrictions on trial-based publicity that form the background to
Richmond Newspapers.
A. Newsgathering and the "Right to Know"
During the 1960s and 1970s, watershed events like the civil rights
movement, the Vietnam War (as well as the Cold War generally), and Wa-
tergate increased popular distrust of the government and fueled support for
27. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 5
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greater openness in government. 8 Congress enacted legislation intended to
increase the public's access to government records, documents, and informa-
tion.29 It was against this background that courts considered assertions that a
"right to know" was grounded in the Constitution.
Various commentators maintained that a "right to know," while not con-
tained within any explicit constitutional provision, was implicit in the First
Amendment and the general principles of a democratic society? The roots
of this idea harkened to Justice Brandeis's description of public discussion
as a "political duty" and "fundamental principle" of American government,3
and were developed into a comprehensive theory of the First Amendment by
the political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn.
According to Meiklejohn, the purpose of the First Amendment was to
protect the people's absolute right to free and unrestricted discussion of
ideas about matters of public interest-a right he maintained flowed from
the people's role as sovereign master over their elected agents and inherent
right to self-government.3 2 Free speech, he maintained, should inform citi-
zens of a wide range of views so that they can make the best decisions in
matters of government.33 The First Amendment's ultimate goal is not to pro-
tect the individual right of each person to speak freely, but rather to ensure
that "everything worth saying shall be said" so that people may govern
themselves effectively.' Meiklejohn viewed the First Amendment not
merely as a limitation on the government's power to restrict speech, but also
as an obligation of the government to take steps to ensure and enrich public
28. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 524, 540; Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First
Amendment Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 237 (1995); David
M. O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know," 7 HASTINGS CON. L.Q.
579, 579, 619 (1980).
29. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002) (granting access to
agency records); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1995) (granting access to
agency meetings). The Freedom of Information Act mandates disclosure of information re-
quested from the executive agencies unless the information falls into one of nine enumerated
categories. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2002).
30. See O'Brien, supra note 28, at 580 (summarizing views).
31. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those
who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American government.").
32. See generally ALEXANDER MEKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965) [hereinafter POLITICAL FREEDOM]; see also Alexander Meik-
lejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255 ("The First
Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of activities of
thought and communication by which we 'govern."'); Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does the
First Amendment Mean, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461, 465 (1952-53) ("Our political freedom guar-
anteed by the [First] Amendment consists in the fact that 'We' have decided that as we go
about the business of governing the nation, that governing shall not, on any grounds, be de-
prived of its freedom by action of any subordinate branch of government.").
33. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 26.
34. Id.
[Vol. 40270
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debate.35 Although he never explicitly linked the constitutional right of pub-
lic access to his theories of democratic self-government, Meiklejohn's ideas
provided the political underpinning of later claims of a "right to know." '36
Others expanded on Meiklejohn's ideas, describing how a right to know en-
compassed other First Amendment values such as ensuring individual
autonomy37 and a multiplicity of viewpoints."
Assertions of a right to know were closely associated with the belief that
the press had a constitutional right to gather news, an idea that gathered
momentum within the academy during the early 1970s,39 obtaining some
support from members of the Court.' If the right to know were to have a
meaningful impact, it would require active participation by an institution like
the press, with the power to disseminate information to the general public.4
Supporters of a special constitutional protection for the press believed it
played an important role in limiting the abuse of power by government offi-
cials. 2
The Court had previously recognized the press's role in promoting the
discussion of public affairs and safeguarding against abuses of power by
public officials.43 Yet, while the Court had protected the press's freedom to
disseminate information from prior restraint even amid claims of national
security," it still resisted the notion that the press had a constitutional right of
35. See id. at 19-20.
36. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for
a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REv. 482, 497 (1980); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal
Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4; cf. Robert Bork, Neutral Princi-
ples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971) ("[Tlhe entire structure
of the Constitution creates a representative democracy, a form of government that would be
meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies.").
37. See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 4-5, 8 (1970).
38. Id. at 10. According to Emerson, the right to obtain information merely formed the
"reverse side of the coin" from the right to communicate and disseminate ideas. Id. at 2.
39. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A
Comment on Some New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 4 n.17 (1990)
(citing articles); Cerruti, supra note 28, at 247.
40. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 722
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The function of the press is to explore and investigate
events, inform the people what is going on, and to expose the harmful as well as the good in-
fluences at work.").
42. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 527-44. Blasi, a leading proponent of this theory,
did not view the checking value as the First Amendment's exclusive function but rather saw it
as a supplement to other First Amendment values such as representative self-government, in-
dividual autonomy, and diversity. See id. at 528, 544. Blasi distinguished the checking and
self-government values primarily based on the fact that the latter protects a much broader
range of communication in comparison to the checking value's focus on official misconduct.
See id. at 558.
43. Mills, 384 U.S. at 219 (invalidating a state statute prohibiting election-day newspaper
endorsements or criticisms of candidates).
44. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ("The Pentagon Papers
Case").
7
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access to information held by the government. Even Justice Stewart, who
supported protecting the press's institutional role under the press clause,
stopped short of advocating that any such privilege be extended to accessing
information, as opposed to preventing restrictions on the press's ability to
receive and disseminate information. '
Until Richmond Newspapers, the Court's recognition of a right to know
thus extended only to the freedom to receive and disseminate information
and ideas,' which it declared "fundamental to our free society." The gov-
ernment might be required to take steps to preserve existing channels of
communication, at least in traditional public forums," but the issue became
more difficult when the information remained within the government's pos-
session or control. Thus, although the Court acknowledged the importance of
newsgathering to a democratic society in an abstract sense, it determined that
newsgathering was not entitled to the same protection as traditional First
Amendment activities like public speaking and publishing, and refused to
acknowledge any special newsgathering privilege under the either the press
or speech clause. 9
This issue first came before the Court in a trio of cases decided under
the name Branzburg v. Hayes.' In Branzburg, the question was whether
journalists could be required to appear and testify before a grand jury about
information they might have obtained from confidential sources.' Recogniz-
45. See Potter Stewart, Or, of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) ("The pub-
lic's interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press,
but the protection is indirect."); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) ("The Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press equal access
once the government has opened its doors."). Similarly, some commentators supported a spe-
cial constitutional status for the press to the extent it would give the press defensive protection
against certain forms of government interference, but did not advocate transforming this pro-
tection into a special right of access to information held by public officials. See, e.g., C.
Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 819, 838-45, 857 (1980) (distinguishing "defensive" and "offensive" rights of the press
and arguing that only the former are entitled to constitutional protection because the latter,
though possessing considerable force, do not maintain institutional autonomy or boundaries).
46. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (declaring unconstitu-
tional the detention of communist propaganda in the mails); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (declaring unconstitutional a prohibition on door-to-door distribution of literature);
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (declaring unconstitutional a licensing tax on
advertising).
47. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
48. See Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right to Judicial Proceedings, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1899, 1903-04 (1978) [hereinafter Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment].
49. See O'Brien, supra note 28, at 619-20 (noting that despite efforts by numerous liti-
gants, the Court has never recognized an enforceable "right to know" under the First Amend-
ment); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 39, at 1, 7-8 (noting the trend of setbacks in First
Amendment claims by newspapers).
50. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
51. Id. at 672-78. Two of the three cases in Branzburg involved challenges by journalists
to grand jury subpoenas seeking testimony about their reporting on the Black Panther Party;
the third case involved a challenge to a grand jury subpoena by a reporter investigating the
[Vol. 40
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ing that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,"52
the Court nonetheless concluded that the burden on newsgathering was out-
weighed by the public interest in law enforcement and effective grand jury
proceedings. 3 The Court denied that the press possessed a privileged status
under the First Amendment,' and noted the exclusion of journalists from
grand jury proceedings, the Court's own conferences, the meetings of other
official bodies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private or-
ganizations.55 Restrictions on newsgathering, the Court explained, were dis-
tinct from restrictions on what the press might choose to publish, and only
the latter was entitled to constitutional protection. 6
Branzburg produced a short concurring opinion by Justice Powell, who
provided the decisive fifth vote, stressing the limited nature of the Court's
holding." Two separate dissenting opinions described why the First
Amendment supported a constitutional right to newsgathering that trumped
the law enforcement concerns underlying grand jury subpoenas. Justice
Douglas, relying primarily on the political theory of Alexander Meiklejohn,58
maintained that journalists play a critical role in society by "bring[ing] ful-
fillment to the public's right to know,... [which] is crucial to the governing
powers of the people."'59 Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, stressed that a reporter's confidential rela-
tionship with his sources stemmed from the broad societal interest in the full
and free flow of information to the public.' Justice Stewart also pointed out
the artificiality of the Court's distinction between dissemination and news-
gathering: "without freedom to acquire information, the right to publish
would be impermissibly compromised."6'
production of narcotics. Id. at 667-79.
52. Id. at 707.
53. Id. at 690-91.
54. Id. at 684 ("It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee
the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public gen-
erally.").
55. Id. at 684-85.
56. Id. at 681-82. The Court had previously distinguished the right to speak and publish
from the right to gather information in a decision sustaining the government's refusal to vali-
date passports to Cuba even though the restriction impeded the free flow of information con-
cerning that country. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). That decision, however,
has been described as involving a restriction on freedom of movement-the right to travel-
as opposed to the right to know. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 37, at 19; see also Kathleen
A. Dockry, Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Government-Held Information: A
Re-Evaluation after Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 292, 306
(1982).
57. 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
58. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
59. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 728. As his opinions in subsequent right of access cases involving prisons
would indicate, Justice Stewart's views about protections for the press did not encompass a
broad right to know. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
9
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The Court next confronted the question of the First Amendment right of
access in a trio of cases involving prisons.'2 Here, the Court explicitly re-
jected claims of a constitutional newsgathering privilege and, by implication,
of a "right to know." The first two cases, Pell v. Procunier,63 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.," decided together, involved challenges by inmates and
news organizations to regulations precluding interviews between the press
and specified prison inmates.65 Relying on Branzburg, the Court held that
because the regulations did not deny the press access to sources available to
members of the general public, they did not violate the First Amendment.'
Justice Stewart, who had dissented in Branzburg, authored the Court's opin-
ions in Pell and Washington Post. While he had supported striking down re-
strictions on the press's relationships with private sources of information in
Branzburg,7 Justice Stewart now accepted restrictions on access to govern-
ment-controlled information, thereby making the principle of government
non-interference with press activities the axis of First Amendment protec-
tion."' Again, the dissenting opinions echoed Meiklejohn's ideals about the
importance of openness and informed public debate in a democratic society,
particularly where it involved institutions with extensive control over indi-
viduals as powerless as prisoners.'
The third prison access case, Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,7 involved the
exclusion of the press and public from portions of a county jail. A broadcast-
ing company claimed it had a First Amendment right to interview inmates
and make recordings, films, and photographs for publication and broadcast-
ing.7 The news organization emphasized the importance of an informed pub-
lic as a safeguard against misgovernment and the critical role of the media in
providing information in a democratic society." In a plurality opinion by
three members of the Court," Chief Justice Burger generally acknowledged
62. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
63. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
64. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
65. Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. at 844. Pell involved a California
prison regulation and Washington Post involved an analogous federal prison regulation.
66. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. at 849.
67. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
68. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. at 849; see also Blasi, supra note
26, at 602 (noting the Court's ambivalence about the newsgathering interest because of its
concern that newsgathering is somehow different than "such core First Amendment activities
as public speaking, pamphleteering, and demonstrating").
69. Pell, 417 U.S. at 839-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free pub-
lic discussion of government affairs.").
70. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
71. ld. at 7-8.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion
in which Justices White and Rehnquist joined. Justice Stewart filed an opinion concurring in
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the critical role of the press in informing the public about issues like prison
conditions, but denied that the press possessed "special" access rights under
the First Amendment. ' Specifically, he distinguished cases upholding the
press's right to disseminate and receive information it has already obtained
from its right to gather new information from government sources." This di-
chotomy reflected an almost proprietary, laissez-faire understanding of free
speech: once the information belongs to a speaker, First Amendment protec-
tion attaches to the speaker as well as a recipient; if, however, the informa-
tion remains in the possession or control of the government, access may be
denied. Again, the dissent stressed the First Amendment's role in ensuring
the free flow of information necessary to representative self-government.76
Thus, Houchins and the other prison access cases seemed to squarely re-
ject the notion of a general "right to know" about the inner workings of gov-
ernment institutions." Subsequent decisions have also rejected assertions of
a newsgathering privilege in other contexts.78 At the same time, the prison
cases did not involve a complete ban on access."9 Although several state-
ments in Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Houchins might suggest
the judgment and Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and
Powell; Justices Marshall and Blackmun took no part in the case.
74. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11, 15.
75. Specifically, the Court distinguished Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936), which struck down a state licensing tax on advertising revenues of newspapers, and
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966), which struck down a state statute criminalizing publi-
cation of editorials about election issues on election day. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8-14.
76. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The preservation of a full
and free flow of information to the general public has long been recognized as a core objec-
tive of the First Amendment .... [T]he First Amendment protects not only the dissemination
but also the receipt of information and ideas.").
77. See id. at 9 ("[The] Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right
of access to all sources of information within government control."). The Court would con-
tinue to articulate a restrictive view of the public and press's First Amendment rights in the
prison setting. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding regulation allowing
only publishers, bookstores, and book clubs to mail hardbound books to pretrial detainees for
fear hardbound books might contain contraband); Jones v. N.C. Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119 (1977) (upholding administrative restriction on preventing union organizing within a
prison).
78. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (no "editorial privilege" to prevent
plaintiff in libel suit from inquiring directly into editors' state of mind); Zucher v. Stanford
Daily News, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search of student newspaper for evidence of identities of
university students involved in attack upon the police was not unconstitutional burden on
newsgathering process).
79. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 830 ("We note at the outset that this regulation is not part of an
attempt by the state to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press' investiga-
tion and reporting of those conditions. Indeed, the record demonstrates that, under current cor-
rections policy, both the press and general public are accorded full opportunities to observe
prison conditions."); see also Wash. Post, 417 U.S. at 851 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The ban
against press interviews is not part[] of any general news blackout in the federal prisons."). In
Pell, the Court justified the restriction as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, un-
derscoring the First Amendment's role in maintaining the political system and the presump-
tive unconstitutionality of any prior restraint on speech. 417 U.S. at 832. 11
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that the newsgathering function is without any First Amendment protection, 80
his opinion was joined by only two other justices (in a case in which only
seven justices participated), and thus did not command a majority of the full
Court.8 Moreover, the plurality opinion described the various ways the me-
dia could still learn indirectly about prison conditions.'
B. Restrictions on Public Access to Trials
Around the same time it was addressing claims of a First Amendment
right to gather news, the Court reviewed challenges to judicially imposed re-
strictions on access to court proceedings. These restrictions were a response
by trial courts to what they saw as the growing risk of prejudice from the ex-
pansion of media coverage of criminal trials. 3 While courts historically had
wide discretion in handling issues of prejudicial pretrial publicity, 8 they
faced increasing pressure to take preventative action to ensure a fair trial. In
reversing the conviction in Sheppard v. Maxwell,85 the celebrated trial of a
Cleveland doctor accused of murdering his wife, the Supreme Court cau-
tioned trial courts to adopt "strong measures to... prevent the prejudice at
its inception." '86 Courts increasingly began to impose restrictions on the dis-
semination of information by the press and litigants.' Restrictions took the
form of restraints on the press's right to report information and the closure of
segments of trials. 88 These restrictions seemed to pit a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury against the First Amend-
ment's free speech guarantee, which Justice Black had called "two of the
80. See, e.g., 438 U.S. at 15 ("Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within
the government's control."); cf. Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 960 F.2d
105, 109 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that while Houchins recognizes "there is no general right
of access to government information.., the line of cases from Richmond Newspapers to
Press-Enterprise IH recognizes that there is a limited constitutional right to some government
information") (emphases in original).
81. See supra note 73.
82. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15; see also Pell, 417 U.S. at 830 (noting that "the press and
general public are accorded full opportunities to observe prison conditions").
83. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal
Cases of National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L.
REV. 39, 41 (1996); see also Hans A. Linde, Fair Trials and Press Freedom-Two Rights
Against the State, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 211, 211 (1977) (noting increasing support for devel-
oping means to ensure fair trials in light of press coverage).
84. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 83, at 42.
85. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
86. Id. at 362-63; see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (suggesting that in
high publicity trials, the presence of the press could be limited when it was apparent that the
accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723,
727 (1963) (allowing for reversal of conviction based on presumed prejudice).
87. Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment, supra note 48, at 1899.
88. See Cerruti, supra note 28, at 253.
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the most cherished policies of our civilization." 9
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart," the Court reviewed a First Amend-
ment challenge to a gag order restricting information news organizations
could publish or broadcast during a highly publicized murder trial. The
Court recognized the danger prejudicial pretrial publicity posed to defen-
dants and the need for trial judges to take steps to mitigate its effects.9 While
it refused to assign one constitutional right priority over the other, the Court
evaluated the restrictions on publicity in light of the heavy presumption
against the validity of prior restraints, and held that the orders violated the
First Amendment.93
Other decisions during this period similarly reflect the Court's resis-
tance to restrictions on the receipt and dissemination of information about
public trials. The Court declared an absolute right of the press to report mat-
ters transpiring in open court,94 recognized the press's right to report trial-
related information obtained out of court,95 and held that a newspaper could
not be subject to criminal prosecution for divulging confidential information
regarding proceedings before a state commission authorized to hear com-
plaints about a judge's disability or misconduct.96 While such decisions fell
within the traditional distinction between restrictions on the receipt or dis-
semination of ideas and access to government-controlled information, they
also echoed the association between open trials and the First Amendment
value of securing the free flow of information in the Court's prior opinions.97
89. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941). But see Linde, supra note 83, at
214-18 (rejecting that the conflict was in fact between the public's First Amendment right of
access and a defendant's right to a fair trial).
90. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
91. Id. at 554-55.
92. Id. at 561-62. As such, the Court determined whether the "'gravity of the evil, dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger."' Id. (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.),
affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
93. Id. at 570. Three members of the Court asserted that prior restraints on the press
could never be a constitutionally permissible means of protecting a defendant's fair trial
rights. See id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (invalidating a Georgia statute au-
thorizing an invasion of privacy suit for publication of the name of a rape victim revealed in
connection with the prosecution for the crime).
95. See Okla. Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (declaring unconstitu-
tional a trial court's pretrial order enjoining the media from publishing the name and photo-
graph of an 11 -year-old boy in connection with a pending juvenile delinquency proceeding at
which the media was present).
96. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
97. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966) ("The principle that justice cannot
survive behind walls of silence has long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for
secret trials."') (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Of course trials must be public and the
public have a deep interest in trials."); see also Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S.
912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("One of the demands of
a democratic society is that the public should know what goes on in the courts by being told13
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Trial judges responded to the Court's decision in Nebraska Press by
closing courtrooms to the press and public,98 which both reduced the risk of
prejudice and avoided the type of prior restraint the Court had declared un-
constitutional. A challenge to courtroom closure first reached the Court in
Gannett Co., Inc. v. Depasquale,9 where a pretrial suppression hearing was
closed to the public, and again the following year in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia"°8 when the entire trial was closed.
Before turning to these decisions, it is useful to summarize key themes
that emerge from the Court's pre-Richmond Newspapers right of access ju-
risprudence. First, the Court distinguished between the right to disseminate
and receive information (accorded full constitutional protection) and the
right to gather news (not accorded full protection). Second, it suggested that
access rights might involve political determinations best left to the legisla-
ture, especially where those rights affected the administrations of institutions
like prisons. Third, a prudential concern appeared about the potentially ex-
pansive, if not limitless, nature of a right of access under which any restric-
tion might be painted as a limitation on the free flow of information. Fourth,
the Court's jurisprudence brought out the particular salience of First
Amendment values in the context of courtroom proceedings. In short, the
Court's resistance to recognizing a broad First Amendment right of access
did not reflect a disagreement with the basic principle that information about
government activities is important to informed public debate, but rather sig-
naled concerns that any such right could be squared with the history and text
of the First Amendment and the proper functioning of the respective
branches of government.
As the next Part describes, the Court would re-examine these and simi-
lar assumptions when it confronted challenges to the closure of criminal tri-
als.
II. RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO CRIMINAL TRIALS
Until Richmond Newspapers, the right to a public trial was thought to
extend only to the accused' under the Sixth Amendment"° to ensure fair-
by the press what happens there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of
criminal justice is fair and right.").
98. See Cerruti, supra note 28, at 255; see also Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 19 (1980) ("With the privilege to pub-
lish secured [by Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart], the interest of the press in access to judicial
proceedings intensified.").
99. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
100. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
101. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) ("Whatever other benefits the guar-
antee to an accused that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the
guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts
as instruments of persecution.").
[Vol. 40
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 40 [2003], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol40/iss2/3
2004] THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS 279
ness in individual cases. 3 The question remained, however, whether there
was a constitutional right to attend a trial if the accused himself sought or
consented to closure. In Gannett Co., Inc. v. Depasquale,'" the Supreme
Court first considered-and rejected-the claim that the press and public
had a Sixth Amendment right to attend a pretrial suppression hearing. The
following year, however, the Court held in Richmond Newspapers that the
press and public have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials' 0 -a
right it would later extend to voir dire proceedings'" and preliminary hear-
ings" and that lower courts would extend to civil trials"08 and various other
proceedings," including some administrative proceedings."' As explained
more fully below, the expansion of constitutional access rights was driven
principally by an understanding of the First Amendment's structural role and
by the functional value of open proceedings.
A. Gannett and the Court's Rejection of a Sixth Amendment Right of Access
The Court was first presented with the question of whether the public
and press had a constitutional right to attend criminal proceedings in Gannett
Co., Inc. v. Depasquale.'" In Gannett, the trial court had granted a defen-
dant's unopposed motion to exclude the public and press from a pretrial sup-
pression hearing in a murder case that had attracted extensive publicity.'
The news organization challenged the exclusion order under both the Sixth
and First Amendments."' As to the Sixth Amendment claim, the media
plaintiff argued that the public trial guarantee extended not only to the ac-
cused, but also to the public itself.'"' The Court recognized a strong societal
interest in public trials, noting that openness improves the quality of testi-
102. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
103. Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment, supra note 48, at 1902.
104. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
105. 488 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion).
106. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise F).
107. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise 11').
108. While the Supreme Court has never addressed the right to attend civil trials, every
federal court of appeals to confront the issue has found a First Amendment right of access un-
der Richmond Newspapers. See, e.g., Rushford v. N.Y. Mag., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988);
Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d
1059 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Cont'l Ill. Secs. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983); Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
109. See infra notes 193-95.
110. See infra note 197.
111. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
112. Id. at 375.
113. Id. at 376.
114. Id. at 384. 15
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mony and provides the public with an opportunity to observe the judicial
system."5 It concluded, however, that this public interest did not create a
constitutional right of access on the part of the public."6 Although the Court
acknowledged the functional value of open trials in ensuring the fairness of
individual proceedings and facilitating public participation in and scrutiny of
the judicial system generally, it ultimately decided the case based on the
Sixth Amendment's textual limitation of the public trial guarantee to the ac-
cused."' The Court then dealt briefly with the alternative claim under the
First Amendment, holding that even assuming the First Amendment guaran-
teed access in some situations, the actions of the trial judge were consistent
with the requirements of any such right."'
Historical tradition played a more significant role in Gannett than in
prior right of access cases, suggesting the influence it would soon exert on
the First Amendment analysis in Richmond Newspapers. In describing the
history of the Sixth Amendment's public trial guarantee, the Court noted the
common law rule of open civil and criminal proceedings." 9 It concluded,
however, that while the Constitution may permit, even presume, open trials
as a norm, it does not require them, but instead merely confers upon the ac-
cused the right to demand a public trial.'20 The existence of a common law
rule of openness, the Court stated, does not itself create a constitutional
right, absent any evidence of the Framer's intent.'' Moreover, the Court ob-
served that pretrial proceedings were "never characterized by the same de-
gree of openness as were actual trials."'22 In a concurring opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Burger, who would author the plurality opinion in Richmond
Newspapers, indicated that historical analysis, as well as questions of the
public interest, was important in determining whether there was a constitu-
tional right of access to judicial proceedings.' He emphasized, however,
that in contrast to criminal trials, pretrial proceedings were not historically
open to the public.'24
Justice Blackmun's dissent, likewise, underscored the importance of
historical evidence, describing in detail the common law and colonial ante-
115. Id. at 383.
116. Id. at 383-84.
117. Id. at391.
118. Id. at 392-93. Justice Powell, who provided the decisive fifth vote in Gannett, dis-
agreed, stating that a news reporter has a protectible First Amendment interest in attending a
pretrial suppression hearing. He concluded, however, that the procedure followed by the trial
court fully comported with the Constitution. Id. at 397-403 (Powell, J., concurring). The dis-
sent, however, did not reach the First Amendment issue. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 385.
120. Id. at 385-86.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 387-88.
123. Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[I]nterest alone does not create a constitu-
tional right.").
124. Id. at 396.
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cedents and original understanding of the Sixth Amendment's public trial
guarantee.'25 Justice Blackmun, however, invested the public trial guarantee
with a much greater functional and structural role, suggesting that its main
purpose, constitutional text notwithstanding, was not to protect the rights of
the accused, but to ensure the effectiveness of the trial process and provide a
check on judicial abuse."6 That role, he believed, also applied to pretrial
suppression hearings because they frequently represent a critical, even deci-
sive stage of criminal proceedings. 2
Although it rejected the existence of a constitutional right of access to
attend pretrial proceedings, the Court underscored that there was no absolute
ban on access because a transcript of the suppression hearing was made
available to the press and public.'28 Moreover, the Court's focus on historical
tradition and the instrumental value of public trials seemed to indicate, at
least in hindsight, that claims of a right of access to judicial proceedings
would be treated differently than would claims of a right of access to gov-
ernment documents, facilities, and the like.
Gannett produced extremely negative reactions among commentators 9
and the press.' Meanwhile, the number of closure orders issued by trial
courts-there were reportedly none prior to Gannett-rose rapidly."' The
following year the Court would again address a media challenge to a closure
order, this time in the context of a First Amendment claim of access to the
trial itself.
B. Richmond Newspapers and a First Amendment Right of Access
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,' the Supreme Court first
recognized a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials. The case in-
volved a challenge to a closure order by the trial judge, granted without sub-
stantial explanation after an unopposed request by the defendant, in the de-
fendant's fourth trial for murder.' While the result was nearly unanimous-
125. Id. at 419, 427 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 421-22.
127. Id. at 436.
128. Id. at 393.
129. See Cox, supra note 98, at 20 ("The Gannett case provoked screams of outrage
from the press and much debate among judges, lawyers, and legal scholars."); Anthony
Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment as a Sword,
1980 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 13.
130. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 602 n.2 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (citing criticism in the press).
131. Cerruti, supra note 28, at 261 (citing informal survey showing that within a year
after Gannett, there were over 270 motions made to close some portion of a criminal case, of
which 146 were granted); see also Lewis, supra note 129, at 1.
132. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
133. The defendant's conviction had been reversed after the first trial; the next two trials
ended in mistrials. See id. at 559. When the local press requested that the state court open the
fourth trial to public and press, the court summarily denied the request with a citation to Gan-17
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of the eight Justices who participated,"M only one dissented 3 -the rationale
was not, as six of the seven Justices who supported the result wrote separate
opinions. 36 In addition to recognizing a First Amendment right to attend
criminal trials, the Court established the basic framework to analyze future
right of access claims. For the first time, the Court expanded the scope of
First Amendment protection from preventing restrictions on the dissemina-
tion of information to ensuring access to information in the form of criminal
court proceedings. 3 '
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion focused extensively on the long
history of open criminal trials and the traditional distrust of secret judicial
proceedings.' He distinguished the Court's prior right of access cases like
Houchins as lacking a long tradition of openness.'39 The Chief Justice also
asserted, however, that a long historical tradition of openness was necessary
but not itself sufficient to establish a constitutional right of access.'" Public
trials, he stated, serve a range of values, including guaranteeing the fairness
of the proceeding,' providing the community with a therapeutic outlet, 2
educating the public about the judicial process,' 3 and promoting confidence
in the administration of justice.'"T
Noting the absence of any support for access rights in the text of the
Constitution or Bill of Rights,"3 he drew upon an instrumentalist understand-
ing of the First Amendment rooted in Meiklejohnian notions of constitu-
tional structure. "[W]ithout the freedom to attend such trials, which people
have exercised for centuries," he observed, "important aspects of freedom of
net. See Cox, supra note 98, at 20.
134. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of the case or in the decision.
135. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 604 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 558 (Burger, C.J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 582 (White, J., concurring); id.
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Court has accorded virtually absolute
protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held
that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatso-
ever."); Cerruti, supra note 28, at 245 (noting that, notwithstanding prior dictum acknowledg-
ing a generalized right to know, the Court had never before held that the press or public was
entitled to obtain information from the government against its will).
138. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 566-74.
139. Id. at 576 n. 11 (citing Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978)).
140. Id. at 575.
141. Id. at 570.
142. Id. at 570-72 ("The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice can-
not function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is done in a comer [or] in
any covert manner.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 572-73 ("Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance
acquired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is se-
cured which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy.") (quoting 6 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE § 1834 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1976)).
144. Id. at 573.
145. Id. at 575.
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speech and of the press could be eviscerated.""' Going beyond the idea that
open trials served a functional value by enhancing the integrity and fairness
of individual proceedings, Chief Justice Burger also described their struc-
tural role in checking abuse 7 and promoting informed public debate about
the judicial system.'48 The First Amendment's speech, press, and assembly
clauses, he continued, "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government." 9
Whereas previously that core purpose might have been construed as merely
to prevent the government from imposing restrictions on the dissemination
or receipt of information, here it required the government to affirmatively
provide access to that information.
Justice Brennan's concurrence also focused on the history and func-
tional value of public trials. Like Chief Justice Burger, Justice Brennan de-
scribed the long tradition of open criminal trials."s Justice Brennan, however,
placed greater emphasis on the structural role of public trials in "securing
and fostering our republican system of self-government.""' Relying heavily
on the political theory of Meiklejohn, he stated that debate on public issues
should not only be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,""' 3 but also "in-
formed."' In addition, he observed, the Court had always seen the First
Amendment's role not only as protecting the free communication of ideas,
but also as opening the judicial system to public inspection. 5 Open trials
thus served a checking function by supplying "a safeguard against any at-
tempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the sup-
pression of political and religious heresies."'56 Thus, whereas Chief Justice
Burger had mainly emphasized the functional value of open trials in terms of
improving individual outcomes, Justice Brennan emphasized their broader
146. Id. at 580 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. at 569 ("'Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of
publicity, all other checks are of small account."') (quoting 1 JEREMY BENTAM, RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
148. Id. at 573 (noting that open trials contribute to "'public understanding of the rule of
law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system . )
(quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
149. Id. at 575.
150. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589-91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 587. For a further discussion of the different approaches of these two opin-
ions, see Note, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 153; see also Lewis,
supra note 129, at 2 (purpose of right of access is to hold "government institutions account-
able").
152. Justice Brennan had previously acknowledged the influence of Alexander Meik-
lejohn. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of
the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965).
153. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 592 (internal quotation marks omitted). 19
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importance in a democratic society, building upon views expressed in dis-
senting opinions in the Court's prior right of access cases. " In breaking with
the Court's previous libertarian conception of the First Amendment, the
"freedom from" restrictions became the "freedom to" obtain information; the
protection of the free interchange of ideas became the protection of the un-
derlying conditions that made such interchange possible.
Yet, Justice Brennan also expressed concern about the implications of
his view of First Amendment access rights. To contain what he termed the
"theoretically endless" potential for expansion of access rights,'58 he outlined
two limiting principles in Richmond Newspapers: whether there is a histori-
cal tradition of openness that implies "the favorable judgment of experi-
ence;' 59 and whether access to a particular government process "is important
in terms of that very process. '' "w Here, Justice Brennan, like Chief Justice
Burger, noted the long history of open trials 6' and the value of openness in
terms of the criminal trial itself, including ensuring that justice satisfies the
appearance of fairness," checking abuse of judicial power," and aiding ac-
curate fact-finding." These "two helpful principles"-historical tradition
and functional value-would later form the foundation of right of access de-
cisions under the "logic" and "experience" test."
Despite a common focus on both the history and functional value of
open trials, there remained important distinctions between Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Brennan's approaches.'" For Chief Justice Burger, the
historical tradition of criminal trials represented a unique aspect of the An-
glo-American legal system and provided an important, if not the most impor-
tant, justification for a First Amendment right of access; for Justice Brennan,
157. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) ("[The First Amendment] embodies our Nation's commitment to popular self-
determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national pol-
icy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues."); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 30
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The preservation of a full and free flow of information to the
general public has long been recognized as a core objective of the First Amendment . .
158. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588.
159. Id. at 589.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
162. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 594.
163. Id. at 596.
164. Id. at 596-97.
165. See Lewis F. Weakland, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gannett
and Richmond Newspapers Public Right of Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 611-18
(1986); Michael Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right to Know"?: Access to
Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REv. 1111,
1117 (1987).
166. Like Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens supported a right of access based on the First
Amendment's role in promoting informed discussion, as he had done in his dissent in
Houchins. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens, however, rejected the need to rely on historical tradition in establishing a right of ac-
cess to criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
[Vol. 40
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 40 [2003], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol40/iss2/3
2004] THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS 285
historical tradition constituted less a basis of the underlying right than a
means of prudentially limiting its scope. Also, Chief Justice Burger sup-
ported access more for the way it enhanced the functioning of individual
criminal trials and criminal justice administration generally than for its con-
tribution to the ideals of informed public debate in a democratic society. 67
While Chief Justice Burger's analysis seemed confined to the context of
criminal trials, with their long, unique history of openness, Justice Brennan's
more structurally-oriented approach was thought by some to herald a new
era of First Amendment law. '6
As the next section demonstrates, the tension between the more tradi-
tion-based approach of Chief Justice Burger and the more structural-based
approach of Justice Brennan would play out in subsequent right of access
cases before the Court as well as before lower courts. While an understand-
ing of the First Amendment's broader political goals would ultimately drive
the Court's expansion of access rights to ancillary criminal proceedings, the
Court not only refused to dispense with the history requirement, but also in-
creasingly appeared to formalize its role into a two-part "logic" and "experi-
ence" test.
C. The Right of Access after Richmond Newspapers
Some commentators believed Richmond Newspapers would usher in ju-
dicial recognition of a broad "right to know;" others, however, predicted the
Court's holding would not extend beyond criminal proceedings."6 While the
Court later extended Richmond Newspapers to other stages of criminal pro-
ceedings, it has never explicitly recognized a right of access outside the con-
text of criminal proceedings, nor acknowledged a general First Amendment
"right to know."
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,7' the Court's first post-
Richmond Newspapers right of access case, the Court held that a Massachu-
setts provision barring the press and public from the courtroom during the
167. For a more general discussion of the difference between functional and structural
approaches, see Joseph F. Kobylka & David M. Dehnel, Toward a Structuralist Understand-
ing of First and Sixth Amendment Guarantees, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 363 (1986). "To
adopt a structuralist point of view is to see unfettered communication as the structural under-
pinning of the political order.... For the functionalist, the first amendment is 'good' insofar
as it acts as a means to promote the 'proper' functioning of political institutions." Id. at 366.
168. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on
Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 311, 311 (1982); see also Richmond Newspa-
pers, 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring) (calling Richmond Newspapers "a watershed
case"); Cerruti, supra note 28, at 279-80.
169. See Hayes, supra note 165, at 1111-12 (describing the wide spectrum of opinion);
see also Cox, supra note 98, at 22-23; Cerruti, supra note 28, at 295, 305 (recognizing that
Richmond Newspapers' potential for transformation of the right of access has not been real-
ized).
170. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 21
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trial testimony of minor rape victims violated the First Amendment.' In an
opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court adopted the structural explanation of
the First Amendment,' stating that the purpose of a right of access to crimi-
nal trials was to ensure that the constitutionally protected free discussion of
public affairs "is an informed one."'7 The Court again noted the importance
of the "two helpful factors" described in Richmond Newspapers: a historical
tradition of openness and the functional value of openness to the proceeding
in question."" The Court, however, rejected the argument that the party seek-
ing access needed to demonstrate a historical tradition of openness with re-
spect to the trial testimony of minor rape victims because of the existence of
an over-arching right of access to criminal trials generally.'75 The Court's
treatment of history prompted a dissent by Chief Justice Burger, who de-
scribed a long tradition of closure of trials involving sexual assaults, espe-
cially against minors, and insisted that Richmond Newspapers required "an
unbroken, uncontradicted" history of openness.'76 The absence of any mean-
ingful reliance by the Court on historical evidence caused some commenta-
tors to speculate that the history prong had faded from importance in the
right of access analysis.
77
In its next two right of access decisions, Press-Enterprise v. Superior
Court ("Press-Enterprise r,,)1' and Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court
("Press-Enterprise IF'), 79 the Court extended Richmond Newspapers to voir
dire and preliminary hearings, respectively. These opinions, both by Chief
Justice Burger, seemed to move away from a discussion of broader structural
concerns and closer towards a more formalized two-pronged test based on
the historical tradition and functional value of access. In recognizing a right
of access to voir dire proceedings in Press-Enterprise I, Chief Justice Burger
observed that such proceedings have traditionally been open to the public'
171. ld. at 610-11.
172. Id. at 604-05 (citing, inter alia, Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond News-
papers).
173. Id. at 605.
174. Id. at 605-06. Although the Court did not articulate a formal two-pronged test in
Globe Newspaper, lower courts subsequently began using "tradition of openness" and "con-
tribution to function" as the test for determining whether a right of access existed. See Hayes,
supra note 165, at 1118.
175. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 n.13.
176. Id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
573).
177. See Cerruti, supra note 28, at 280; Beth Hornbuckle Fleming, Comment, First
Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases, 32 EMORY L.J. 619,
630 (1983).
178. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
179. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
180. 464 U.S. at 505 (describing the tradition of open voir dire proceedings as "helpful");
see also Kobylka & Dehnel, supra note 167, at 386 (noting that Press-Enterprise I "ignores
structural concerns" in several ways).
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and that openness has served an important function."' The evidence of a tra-
dition of openness, however, was less compelling than in Richmond News-
papers, and the Court relied on isolated examples from the historical record
to support its decision in favor of access rights.8 ' In contrast, Justice Ste-
vens' concurring opinion provided an explicit structural justification for
open voir dire proceedings, stating that the purpose of access "was much
broader" than "simply the interest in effective judicial administration," and
reflected the First Amendment's goal of ensuring the informed public debate
central to representative self-government. 3
Press-Enterprise II involved a challenge to a trial court's closure of a
preliminary proceeding in which a magistrate had determined there was
probable cause to bind the defendant over for trial. Just two years before, the
Court had held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial
extended to a pretrial suppression hearing," reasoning that the right of the
accused was "no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First
Amendment right of the press and public."'' 5 Like Press-Enterprise I, Press-
Enterprise II did not explicitly discuss the structural principles underlying
the First Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings. Rather, the
Court described the historical tradition and functional value of a tradition of
open pretrial proceedings," and appeared to incorporate those values into a
two-pronged "logic" and "experience" test.'" With respect to the latter, the
Court pointed to the celebrated treason trial of Aaron Burr in 180788 and de-
cisions by state courts-mostly after Richmond Newspapers and the earliest
in 1976-as evidence of open pretrial hearings. 9 The Court also noted that
during the mid-nineteenth century, preliminary hearings were presumptively
open and could only be closed for cause shown.19" Thus, the Court in Press-
Enterprise H eschewed any need for a lengthy tradition of openness in order
to find a constitutional right of access, a point noted by Justice Stevens in his
181. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 508 (noting that open voir dire proceedings enhance
"both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to pub-
lic confidence in the system"). As in Richmond Newspapers, the Court also described the
therapeutic value of openness in Press-Enterprise 1. Id. at 508-09 ("Proceedings held in secret
would deny this outlet and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public proceedings
vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are being
brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected.").
182. Id. at 506-07.
183. Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., concurring). "IT]he underpinning of our holding today is not
simply the interest in effective judicial administration; the First Amendment's concerns are
much broader." Id.
184. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
185. Id. at 46.
186. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
187. Id. at 8-9 ("If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of experience
and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches.").
188. See id. at 10.
189. See id. at 12 n.3.
190. Id. at 10-11. 23
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dissent. 9' With respect to the "logic" prong, the Court essentially reiterated
the functional values of access expressed in Press-Enterprise I, though also
adding that the absence of a jury enhanced the importance of open prelimi-
nary proceedings, which served as "an inestimable safeguard against the cor-
rupt or overzealous prosecutor."'92
Lower courts, meanwhile, extended Richmond Newspapers to additional
ancillary criminal proceedings such as various types of pretrial hearings,"'
plea and sentencing hearings, 9 criminal court documents," civil trials,'"
and to some administrative proceedings.'" At the same time, some courts
sought to restrict the scope of Richmond Newspapers, claiming it repre-
sented a narrow exception to the general rule against a constitutional right of
access to government information.'
The application of Richmond Newspapers' "logic" and "experience" test
has also varied widely among lower courts. Some have strictly applied the
test, insisting on a demonstration of both a tradition of access and the utility
191. Id. at 21-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the relative weakness of historical evi-
dence of openness in Press-Enterprise II, compared to Richmond Newspapers).
192. See id at 12-13.
193. See Fleming, supra note 177, at 637 n.61, 645 (citing cases extending the right of
access to various pretrial proceedings including suppression hearings, entrapment hearings,
competency hearings, pretrial detention hearings, and ball reduction hearings).
194. See, e.g., In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986).
195. See, e.g., Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d
569, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1988) (right of access to affidavit in support of a search warrant); Seat-
tle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988) (right of ac-
cess to pretrial release documents).
196. See supra note 108.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002) (right of
access to university student disciplinary board proceedings); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v.
Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (right of access to municipal
planning meeting); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th
Cir. 1992) (applying Richmond Newspapers to a claim for access to a list of voters eligible to
vote in a referendum on a marketing order); Soc'y of Prof'1 Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 616
F. Supp. 569, 574 (D. Utah 1985) (right of access to formal administrative hearing conducted
by the mine safety commission), vacated as moot, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987). But see
First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 472 (3d Cir.
1986) (applying Richmond Newspapers test to hearings of an administrative disciplinary
board established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to investigate complaints against state
judges but denying a constitutional right of access based on "the unique history and function
of the [board]").
198. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935-36 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (rejecting application of Richmond Newspapers to request for access to arrest re-
cords of those detained during investigation into attacks of September 11), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 1041 (2004); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1173 (3d Cir. 1986)
(rejecting that Richmond Newspapers and its progeny provide a right of access to executive
branch files of a state environmental agency because they "hold no more than that the gov-
ernment may not close government proceedings which have historically been open unless
public access contributes nothing of significant value to that process or unless there is a com-
pelling state interest in closure and a carefully tailored resolution of the conflict between that
interest and First Amendment concerns").
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of openness to the particular proceeding in question.'" While the party seek-
ing access has generally been able satisfy the "logic" prong, the "experi-
ence" prong has presented greater obstacles and has served as a basis for de-
nying access in a number of instances."° Conversely, other courts have relied
more heavily, sometimes exclusively, on the "logic" prong in recognizing a
right of access without reference to any evidence of a tradition of open-
ness."' Another approach has been to avoid the application of the "logic"
and "experience" test altogether in favor of a more conventional balancing
test that weighs the public interest in disclosure against the government's in-
terest in denying access. 2
Thus, in the aftermath of Richmond Newspapers, courts have extended a
First Amendment right of access to various proceedings other than criminal
trials. The history prong has proven among the most controversial aspect of
access law, and some courts have either downplayed its importance or ig-
nored it altogether in light of its minimal relation to the structural and func-
tional value of access. Also, while courts have extended the Richmond
Newspapers framework to various administrative proceedings, prior to Sep-
tember 11, none had addressed its application to immigration proceedings
nor confronted a blanket closure rule like the Creppy Directive. The follow-
ing Part discusses the decisions by the first-and only-two appeals courts
that have addressed the question of whether the press and public possess a
First Amendment right to attend deportation hearings.
199. See, e.g., In re Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (denying right of access to evidentiary exhibits in civil proceedings).
"With neither the functioning constraint of text nor the constraint of historical practice, noth-
ing would separate the judicial task of constitutional interpretation from the political task of
enacting laws currently deemed essential." Id. at 1332.
200. See, e.g., Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1174-76.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding a right
of access to post-trial juror examinations based only on the "logic" prong where no tradition
of access had been established); Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d
1513, 1516 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a right of access to pretrial release proceedings and
documents based principally on the growing importance of such proceedings); United States
v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding a right of access to pretrial hearings
based upon the "societal interests" at stake); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th
Cir. 1983) (finding right of access to bail reduction hearings despite the absence of a historical
tradition); see also Fleming, supra note 177, at 626, 633-34 (arguing that history alone does
not provide a logical basis for limiting a right of access to trials given the First Amendment's
structural role and the increase in relative importance of pretrial proceedings to the criminal
justice process in the last 200 years); cf. In re Consumer Power Co. Secs. Litig., 109 F.R.D.
45, 53-55 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (analyzing First Amendment challenge to protective order re-
stricting public access to pretrial discovery documents in terms of "the functional needs of
contemporary society" and recognizing general right of access but upholding the particular
protective order); Herald Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Parole, 499 N.Y.S.2d 301, 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Onondaga County 1985) (right of access to parole revocation hearings; emphasizing the struc-
tural importance of access when the merits of the parole process "are being hotly debated").
202. Hayes, supra note 165, at 1122 (citing cases).
289
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III. THE APPLICATION OF RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS TO DEPORTATION
HEARINGS BY THE THIRD AND SIXTH CIRCUITS
In the wake of September 11, both the Third and Sixth Circuits ad-
dressed constitutional challenges to the Creppy Directive, which closed de-
portation hearings in a category of so-called "special interest" cases based on
an unreviewable decision by the U.S. Department of Justice. 3 In Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft," the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of the Creppy Directive, finding the
blanket closure rule unconstitutional. In contrast, in North Jersey Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,"5 the Third Circuit reversed the district court's order
enjoining enforcement of the blanket closure rule. While the injunction in
Detroit Free Press applied to a single individual's immigration proceed-
ings,"1 6 the injunction in North Jersey Media Group was nationwide in
scope." Although they reached opposite conclusions, both courts rejected
the government's argument for a more deferential standard of review in fa-
vor of review under Richmond Newspapers. This Part will examine the two
decisions, focusing on each court's treatment of the First Amendment's
structural role, the application of Richmond Newspapers' "logic" and "ex-
perience" test, and the relevance of the government's extensive, but constitu-
tionally limited power over immigration to the question of First Amendment
access rights.
A. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft
In Detroit Free Press, several newspapers sought to challenge an immi-
gration judge's closure of a bond hearing for one individual, Rabih Haddad,
who was subject to deportation for having overstayed his tourist visa.0" The
government further suspected that the Islamic charity Haddad operated was
supplying funds to terrorist organizations.2" Haddad was denied bail and de-
tained, and subsequent hearings were closed to the press, public, and mem-
bers of Haddad's family."0 Plaintiffs, two media organizations and a con-
gressional representative, sued, claiming the closure of Haddad's
proceedings violated the First Amendment.2" The district court ruled in favor
203. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
204. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), pet. for reh'g en banc denied (Jan. 22, 2003).
205. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
206. 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
207. 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305-06 (D.N.J. 2002).
208. 195 F. Supp. 2d at 940-41.
209. See Dan Eggen & Kari Lydersen, In Michigan, Anti-Terrorism Effort Goes Public:
Haddad Case Forces Rare Glimpse of Secret U.S. Campaign, WASH. POST, May 6, 2002, at
A3.
210. Id.
211. Haddad brought a separate action claiming that the closure of his deportation pro-
ceedings violated his Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Haddad v. Ashcroft,
221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
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of the plaintiffs,'12 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
2t 3
As a threshold matter, the Sixth Circuit addressed the standard of review
governing plaintiffs' First Amendment claim. The court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that the Creppy Directive was entitled to deferential re-
view,14 finding that while Congress' plenary authority over immigration ex-
tended to "substantive" immigration decisions-who may be deported or
excluded-it did not extend to non-substantive ones, such as whether to
close a deportation hearing to the public. 2 - The Supreme Court, the Sixth
Circuit observed, "has always interpreted the Constitution meaningfully to
limit non-substantive immigration laws, without granting the Government
special deference," '16 including the Due Process2 7 and First Amendment 8
rights of individuals facing deportation.
The court distinguished Kleindienst v. Mandel,"9 a Cold War-era deci-
sion upholding the Attorney General's denial of a non-immigrant visa to a
self-proclaimed "revolutionary Marxist" to speak at a university conference
under a statute prohibiting the entrance of "anarchists" or "persons advocat-
ing the overthrow of government."2 In rejecting a First Amendment chal-
lenge by the intended audience of professors, the Court stated that it would
not look behind a facially legitimate and bona fide explanation for the Ex-
ecutive's exercise of congressionally delegated power over the policies and
rules governing the exclusion of aliens.22' The Sixth Circuit concluded, how-
ever, that Kleindienst involved Congress' substantive power to set immigra-
tion policy, whereas the Creppy Directive involved a procedural mechanism
chosen to carry out that policy.222 In maintaining the substance-procedure di-
chotomy, the court invoked the checking purpose at the heart of the First
Amendment that prevents the government from "act[ing] arbitrarily and be-
hind closed doors." 23 The traditional deference given to the government's
decisions over whom to admit, the court stated, did not extend to the proce-
dures used to administer the deportation process itself.224 Although the court
did not expressly draw the analogy, a similar point could have been made
212. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
213. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). Haddad's removal
proceedings were subsequently opened to the public, except for portions that were closed to
protect sensitive sources and identifying information. Haddad's removal order was later af-
firmed by the Bureau of Immigration Appeals. In re Haddad, 27 Immig. Rptr. B1-47 (2003).
214. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 685-86.
215. Id. at 686 (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)).
216. Id. at 688.
217. Id. at 688-90 (discussing Fifth Amendment due process cases).
218. Id. at 690-91 (noting the "ample foundation" for this proposition).
219. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
220. Id. at 756-59.
221. Id. at 769-70.
222. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 687.
223. id. at 693.
224. Id.
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about Richmond Newspapers itself: while the government possesses broad
powers to establish substantive matters of criminal law to determine who
may be punished for what activity, that power is separate from the process
used to implement those decisions, including whether to close a criminal
trial to the press and public.
The court also distinguished Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,225 which it charac-
terized as involving a claim for special press rights beyond those granted to
the general public. 26 More importantly, the court concluded that access to
prison facilities posed fundamentally different questions than access to
quasi-judicial proceedings like deportation hearings. 27 It emphasized that a
deportation hearing, though administrative in name, remains an adversarial,
adjudicative process in which the stakes for the individual are equal to, if not
greater than, those in many criminal or civil actions.228 The court noted that
recent Supreme Court decisions underscored the importance of analyzing the
nature and function of a proceeding rather than looking only at its label.229 It
concluded that to the extent Houchins remained valid after Richmond News-
papers, it did not apply to formal, adversarial proceedings such as deporta-
tion hearings.2"
The court next applied Richmond Newspapers' "logic" and "experi-
ence" test to determine whether there was a constitutional right of access to
deportation hearings. Relying on Press-Enterprise H and its own precedents,
the court proceeded to reject the government's argument that the plaintiffs
needed to demonstrate a common law tradition of access.2 ' It instead inter-
preted the Supreme Court's post-Richmond Newspapers decisions as elevat-
ing the importance of "logic" over "experience," and concluded that, while
some history of openness was necessary, even "a brief historical tradition"
might suffice where "the beneficial effects of access to that process are
overwhelming and uncontradicted." '32
225. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). For a discussion of Houchins, see supra notes 70-77 and accom-
panying text.
226. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 694.
227. Id. at 696. Further, in Houchins there existed alternative, though less effective,
means of gaining information, in contrast to the blanket closure policy under the Creppy Di-
rective. Id. at 696 n.12 (citing Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12-16).
228. Id. at 696 ("'Deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile."') (quoting
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
229. Id. at 696-97. The court cited two decisions: Fed. Mar. Comm. v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002), which held that state sovereign immunity bars an administra-
tive agency's adjudication of complaints by a private party against a non-consenting state
since such administrative proceedings closely resemble those in civil litigation that typically
fell within the state sovereign immunity bar; and Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000), which
held that because Social Security proceedings were not adversarial proceedings, the ordinary
waiver rule did not apply to claims not presented on an administrative appeal of the agency's
initial decision by an administrative law judge.
230. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 699.
231. Id. at700.
232. Id. at 701.
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The court concluded that there was a sufficient tradition of openness to
satisfy Richmond Newspapers' history prong. While Congress had repeat-
edly enacted statutes closing exclusion hearings since the late nineteenth
century, it had never required closure of deportation hearings.233 Moreover,
the court noted, INS regulations had established a presumption of open de-
portation hearings since 1964."M The absence of a common law right of ac-
cess to administrative proceedings could be explained by the relatively re-
cent birth of the modem administrative state and its evolving nature in the
direction of greater openness.23
Turning to Richmond Newspapers' "logic" prong, the court described
the various ways in which access improves the functioning of deportation
proceedings, including checking the actions of Executive branch officials,
ensuring the proceedings are conducted fairly, increasing the accuracy of de-
terminations in individual cases, allowing for a much-needed catharsis after
the traumatic events of September 11, and helping ensure the participation of
citizens in the democratic process by fostering informed public debate.236 Af-
ter concluding that the history and functional value prongs had been met, the
court determined that the blanket closure order did not satisfy strict scrutiny
because it was neither narrowly tailored nor required particularized findings
to justify its application to Haddad's case.23
While the Sixth Circuit adhered to the "logic" and "experience" test, its
understanding of the First Amendment was informed by the structural con-
siderations underlying Richmond Newspapers that stress the way open pro-
ceedings promote informed public debate and check the abuse of power by
government officials. The Constitution, the court stated, requires open de-
portation hearings because "[diemocracies die behind closed doors.""23 The
court underscored the particular salience of a First Amendment right of ac-
cess to deportation hearings in light of the government's extensive power
over immigration policy. Indeed, it is here, where the government's power is
otherwise at or near its zenith, that a right of public access becomes even
more important as a check on the abuse of that power.239
233. Id.
234. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.27, redesignated as 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2003)). As the court
observed, the tradition of open deportation hearings stands in contrast with that of exclusion
hearings, where no comparable tradition of access exists. Id. (citing Immigration Laws and
Regulations, Article 6, at 4 (Mar. 11, 1893); Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213
(1903); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, § 236(a) (1952)).
235. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 702-03. The court further noted that to the extent
there were functional common law analogues to deportation proceedings-for example, the
orders of transportation or banishment entered in criminal trials-they were open to the pub-
lic. Id. at 702.
236. Id. at 703-05.
237. Id. at 705.
238. Id. at 683; see also id. at 704-05 (referring specifically to the First Amendment's
self-government and checking values in its analysis under Richmond Newspapers' functional
value prong).
239. Id. at 704 ("In an area such as immigration, where the government has nearly
29
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B. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft
In North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,'" the Third Circuit
reached a different outcome than the Sixth Circuit, but came to a similar
conclusion on the threshold question of whether Richmond Newspapers ap-
plied to deportation proceedings. Richmond Newspapers, the Third Circuit
maintained, was not limited to proceedings under Article III of the Constitu-
tion, despite the absence of an explicit textual guarantee of access in non-
Article III proceedings like deportation hearings."' The court rejected the
government's argument that the proper degree of access to administrative
proceedings should be left to the political branches, citing its own precedents
applying Richmond Newspapers to determine whether there was a constitu-
tional right of access to the records of a state environmental agency" 2 and to
a judicial disciplinary review board.243
The Third Circuit concluded, however, that Richmond Newspapers did
not support a constitutional right of access to deportation hearings.2" In con-
trast to criminal trials, it observed, there was no long history of a general
right of public access to deportation hearings or other governmental proceed-
ings or information.2" ' In contrast to the Sixth Circuit,246 the Third Circuit
concluded that the 1964 INS regulations creating a rebuttable presumption of
openness in deportation hearings did not provide a sufficient basis to estab-
lish a constitutional right of access, particularly in light of its conclusion that
some deportation hearings may have been closed to the public, such as those
conducted in prisons, hospitals, or private homes.247 While the court ac-
knowledged that a showing of openness at common law was not required,2 8
it nonetheless refused to find that Richmond Newspapers' "experience"
prong had been met where the historical evidence was "ambiguous or lack-
unlimited authority, the press and the public serve as perhaps the only check on abusive gov-
ernment practices.").
240. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
241. Id. at 207.
242. Id. at 208 (citing Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir.
1986)).
243. Id. (citing First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d
467 (3d Cir. 1986)).
244. Id. at 220-21.
245. Specifically, the court noted the views of certain Framers, such as Patrick Henry,
that not all government activities, including "'military operations or affairs of great conse-
quence,' should be publicized. Id. at 209 (quoting 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES 170 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1881)). The court also observed that the Senate had met behind closed doors until 1794
and the House until after the War of 1812, and that congressional committee sessions re-
mained closed until the mid-1970s. Id. at 209-10. Many proceedings, it further observed, be-
fore administrative agencies are closed, such as Social Security disability hearings and dis-
barment hearings. Id. at 210.
246. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
247. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 212.
248. Id. at 213.
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ing" or, alternatively, to recognize a First Amendment right of access based
on "logic" alone." 9 Distinguishing its prior precedents denying the relevancy
of historical analysis in determining First Amendment access rights to pre-
trial criminal proceedings," ° the court emphasized the importance of the his-
tory prong, even in the administrative context." ' Finally, while the court re-
jected the government's argument that the political branch's plenary power
over immigration required deference to the executive branch's decision to
close deportation hearings," it nonetheless invoked more general principles
of deference to an administrative agency's attempt to formulate its own rules
of procedure," thus re-characterizing Richmond Newspapers' "experience"
prong as a device to "preserve administrative flexibility and avoid constitu-
tionalizing ambiguous, and potentially unconsidered, executive decisions. '2
Turning to the "logic" prong, the Third Circuit employed a novel ap-
proach. It acknowledged that openness in deportation hearings serves the
same values it serves in public criminal trials." It stated, however, that
courts must also take account of "the flip side"--the extent to which open-
ness "impairs the public good." 6 Here, the court detailed the various ways
open deportation hearings in a narrow category of "special interest" cases
would threaten national security2 7-the type of concerns that typically
would have been addressed under a strict scrutiny analysis only after a court
had first determined that there was qualified right of access under Richmond
Newspapers. In light of the profound and unknown dimension of terrorist
threats, the court found that openness did not on balance play a positive role
in "special interest" deportation proceedings.258 Because open hearings failed
to satisfy either the "experience" or "logic" prongs, the court found no First
Amendment right of access to "special interest" deportation hearings. 9
249. Id.
250. United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982). The court explained that
Criden had arisen in the criminal context, where the tradition of openness was well estab-
lished, in contrast to administrative proceedings, where the historical evidence was more un-
even and ambiguous. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 213 (citing Criden, 675 F.2d at
555).
251. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 214.
252. Id. at 219 n.15.
253. Id. at 216 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
433 U.S. 519, 544 (1978)).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 217 (describing those values as: promoting informed discussion of govern-
ment affairs; promoting public perception of fairness; supplying an outlet for community con-
cem, hostility, and emotion; checking corrupt practices by exposing the judicial process to
public scrutiny; enhancing the performance of those involved; and discouraging perjury).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 217-18.
258. Id. at 220.
259. Id. The court, however, never explicitly addressed the issue of a First Amendment
right of access to typical, i.e., non-special interest, deportation proceedings. "We do not de-
cide that there is no right to attend administrative proceedings, or even that there is no right to
attend any immigration proceeding. Our judgment is confined to the extremely narrow class31
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C. Comparing the Third and Sixth Circuit's
Application of Richmond Newspapers
In rejecting the government's arguments for deferring to the Creppy Di-
rective as an exercise of the government's plenary power over immigration,
the Third and Sixth Circuits refused to treat deportation hearings as categori-
cally different than criminal (or civil) proceedings for purposes of deciding
whether to apply Richmond Newspapers' "logic" and "experience" test. Both
courts thus found it more significant that the restriction on access involved
an adjudicative proceeding rather than the fact it involved the federal immi-
gration power-a view echoed by the D.C. Circuit in its recent decision in-
volving release of the names and other information about the September 11
detainees."w In other respects, however, the two courts diverged sharply in
addressing the issues surrounding a constitutional right of access to deporta-
tion proceedings.
In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the historical evidence of open
deportation proceedings satisfied the "experience" prong, the Third Circuit
emphasized the importance of history as a limiting factor and the need to re-
strict Richmond Newspapers to its original context of criminal trials. 6' At the
same time, it rejected the traditional approach to the "logic" prong by incor-
porating national security concerns to determine whether, on balance, access
played a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular sub-
category of proceedings in question, i.e., "special interest" deportation hear-
ings, as opposed to deportation hearings generally." This approach effec-
tively transforms Richmond Newspapers' "logic" prong into an analysis of
whether closure in a narrow category of cases is justified-an approach the
Court itself seemed to reject in Globe Newspaper.263 The Third Circuit's ap-
of deportation cases that are determined by the Attorney General to present significant na-
tional security concerns." Id.
260. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 934
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim for disclosure of the names of September 11 de-
tainees under the First Amendment because "Richmond Newspapers does not extend to non-
judicial documents that are not part of a criminal trial, such as the investigatory documents
[akin to "arrest records"] at issue here.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041
(2004). In distinguishing Detroit Free Press, the D.C. Circuit suggested the critical feature of
Richmond Newspapers was not that it involved a criminal trial but that plaintiffs sought ac-
cess to an adjudicatory proceeding rather than an investigation. See id. at 936. Although the
plaintiffs in Center for National Security Studies also sought relief under the First Amend-
ment, their primary claim was under the Freedom of Information Act.
261. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 212.
262. ld. at 217-19.
263. 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.13 (1982) (emphasizing that the threshold focus must be on the
right of access to criminal trials rather than on the arguments for restricting access in a par-
ticular instance); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
("Press-Enterprise If') (focusing threshold inquiry on whether access benefited the function-
ing of preliminary hearings generally, not its benefit in a particular case); First Amendment
Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (looking not to past
practices of state's disciplinary board, but rather to tradition of access to judicial disciplinary
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proach could also relieve the government of its burden, assuming a First
Amendment right of access exists, of narrowly tailoring restrictions, and thus
sanctioning blanket closure rules in the name of national security.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit hewed to a more straightforward applica-
tion of the "logic" and "experience" test, basing a First Amendment right of
access to deportation proceedings on the historical evidence of openness-
which was less than the hundreds of years of openness in Richmond News-
papers, but was nonetheless consistent with the type of historical evidence of
openness described in Press-Enterprise Il-and on the functional value of
openness in an adversarial, trial-type proceeding even if the proceeding is
administrative in name.2" While the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the impor-
tant national security concerns at stake, it restricted consideration of these
concerns to a determination of whether the government had narrowly tai-
lored the restrictions rather than allowing those concerns to swallow the an-
tecedent question of whether openness was generally beneficial in terms of
the proceeding itself."
Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group together suggest
some differences in applying Richmond Newspapers to deportation hearings,
particularly in the aftermath of September 11 and heightened concerns of ter-
rorism. In limiting Richmond Newspapers' reach by insisting on an exces-
sively lengthy tradition of access-lengthier than under its own prece-
dents-and subsuming the national security concerns for a select category of
cases into the overall "logic" prong analysis, North Jersey Media Group un-
dercuts the important structural role of access that lies at the heart of Rich-
mond Newspapers and the First Amendment. Its assessment of the length of
time deportation hearings have been open to the public may not only under-
estimate the tradition of openness,2" but also overwhelms fundamental con-
cerns about the dangers of eliminating for an entire class of people access to
a proceeding with important similarities to criminal trials. It also negates the
obvious functional value of open deportation hearings and frees the govern-
ment to close any deportation hearing when it deems necessary, without en-
suring that this power be employed cautiously based on an individualized as-
sessment of the facts.
The Sixth Circuit's approach hews more closely to the Supreme Court's
decisions in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny. Yet, Detroit Free Press
also highlights some of the potential risks of a rigid application of the
"logic" and "experience" test. While, as the Sixth Circuit concluded, the his-
torical evidence indicates that deportation hearings have a sufficient history
and grand jury proceedings generally).
264. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701-05 (6th Cir. 2002).
265. Id.
266. See Reply Brief for Petitioner in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5,
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (suggesting that
open deportation hearings predate significantly the 1964 INS regulation establishing presump-
tively open deportation proceedings), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003). 33
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of openness to satisfy the "experience" prong under the Court's prece-
dents, 67 the history of openness itself does not explain the link between open
deportation proceedings and the broader considerations underlying First
Amendment access rights. Before presenting another approach to these is-
sues, some subsequent developments in this litigation will be briefly dis-
cussed.
D. The Continuing Importance of a Right of Access
to Deportation Hearings
Following the Third Circuit's decision, the plaintiffs sought review in
the Supreme Court.68 In its opposition papers, the government claimed for
the first time that the Creppy Directive was "currently under review" and
would "likely be revised."2 The government further noted that it had al-
ready promulgated and was applying, in appropriate circumstances, an
emergency interim regulation that allowed for closure on a case-by-case ba-
sis. 7' The government also noted that the decision in the Sixth Circuit af-
fected only one individual's case and that those proceedings had now been
administratively completed. 7' Notwithstanding that the Creppy Directive
remained in existence and that there existed a direct circuit split on its
constitutionality, the Court denied certiorari.22
Less than a week later, the Office of Inspector General ("OIG"), the in-
ternal monitoring arm of the Department of Justice, issued a 239-page report
detailing various abuses associated with the government's secret detention of
762 immigrants after September I L73 Although cognizant of the increased
pressures on law enforcement officials after September 11, the report sharply
criticized the government's treatment of the detainees in numerous respects,
including: the "indiscriminate" and "haphazard" labels applied to nonciti-
267. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701-03.
268. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
269. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, North
Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
2215 (2003).
270. Id. (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799 (2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2003))).
271. Id. at lO.
272. 123 S. Ct. 2215 (May 27, 2003) (No. 02-1289). The denial of certiorari was criti-
cized by the press. See, e.g., Editorial, Are Secret, Post-9/11 Hearings OK? Court Should Say,
NEWSDAY, May 28, 2003, at A30; cf. Editorial, Deportation Behind Closed Doors, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 30, 2003, at A26 (linking Court's denial of certiorari to government's indication
that it was currently reviewing its procedures for closed hearings and would reduce its use of
closed hearings in the future).
273. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF
THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (April 2003) (released June 2, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oigldetainees.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2004) [here-
inafter OIG REPORT].
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zens with no connection to terrorism that significantly prolonged their deten-
tion;274 a blanket "no bond" policy regardless whether there was any evi-
dence to detain aliens in individual cases; 75 restrictions on the detainee's ac-
cess to counsel;2 76 and the terrible conditions of confinement, including
allegations of physical and verbal abuse.2 77 The OIG report not only links the
deportation hearings with a broader policy of abuse,2 78 but also underscores
that the prolonged secret detentions lacked justification.279
In short, while the government signaled its intention not to enforce the
Creppy Directive, it refused to disavow it, and, in light of the prolonged and
indefinite nature of the "war against terrorism," might again resort to the di-
rective or a similar policy in the future. Indeed, the Attorney General re-
sponded to the OIG report criticizing the treatment of the September 11 de-
tainees by denying that the Justice Department did anything wrong and
seeking even greater powers from Congress.8 Meanwhile, the basic ques-
tion of whether there is a constitutional right of access to deportation pro-
ceedings-among the most important and complex questions in First
Amendment access law since Richmond Newspapers-remains unaddressed
by the nation's highest court. Additionally, the Court more recently denied
review in a case involving a September 11 immigration detainee whose en-
tire federal habeas corpus proceedings in the district court were closed to the
public and all court filings sealed.28" ' The challenge by media organizations
was brought only after a clerk of the court inadvertently disclosed the exis-
tence of the appeal by listing it on a public oral argument calendar and show-
ing its name under the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
service, which led to a nationally published newspaper story. 82 The entire
habeas case, including its very existence, was "heard, appealed, and decided
274. Id. at 70; see also id. at 37-71.
275. Id. at 72-90.
276. Id. at 130-42, 172-77.
277. Id. at 142-50, 177-82.
278. See, e.g., David Cole, We've Aimed, Detained and Missed Before, WASH. POST,
June 8, 2003, at B 1 (discussing abuses highlighted by the OIG report; underscoring the dan-
gers of "preventative" detention).
279. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Pursuit of Immigrants in America After September 11,
N.Y. TaMms, June 8, 2003, § 4, at 14 ("The detentions were often supported by flimsy evi-
dence and inconsistent criteria.").
280. See, e.g., Ashcroft Defends Government on Detainees, REUTERS, June 5, 2003,
http://www.nytimes.comreuters/politics/politics-congress-ashcroft.htm (last visited June 6,
2003) (on file with author); Erich Lichtblau, Ashcroft Seeks More Power to Pursue Terrorist
Suspects, N.Y. TPAFs, June 6, 2003, at Al. But see Erich Lichtblau, U.S. Will Tighten Rules
on Holding Terror Suspects, N.Y. TMEs, June 13, 2003, at Al (noting planned changes by
federal authorities in response to shortcomings in anti-terrorism and detention policies high-
lighted by the OIG report).
281. M.K.B. v. Warden, 124 S. Ct. 1405, No. 03-6747, 2004 WL 324470 (Feb. 23,
2004).
282. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, M.K.B. v. Warden, No. 03-6747, 2003 WL
23139103, at *9 n.1. 35
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in complete secrecy."2"3
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DEPORTATION HEARINGS
This Part describes the importance of a constitutional right of access to
deportation proceedings based not only upon Richmond Newspapers, but
also upon the broader goals of the First Amendment.
First, it examines how structural theories of the First Amendment run
through the Court's free speech decisions in many areas. It identifies the two
principal-and related-components of a structurally-based constitutional
right of access: ensuring the informed political debate fundamental to repre-
sentative self-government; and checking the abuse of power by public offi-
cials.
Second, this Part explains why Richmond Newspapers, rather than other
First Amendment access decisions like Houchins, provides the appropriate
starting point to approach the question of whether there is a constitutional
right to attend deportation hearings.
Third, it describes the basis for a First Amendment right of access to
deportation hearings. It describes why access is required by the First
Amendment's structural goals. It emphasizes the significance of the similar-
ity between deportation hearings and criminal trials from the First Amend-
ment perspective. It then discusses how Richmond Newspapers' "experi-
ence" prong should not be applied rigidly in light of the country's past
practice of mistreating noncitizens in times of crisis and its otherwise expan-
sive power to regulate immigration.
A. Structural Theories of the First Amendment
Under a structurally-based theory of free speech, the First Amendment's
main concern is not to protect an individual's right to speak out but rather
the people's right to the free flow of information that is so central to the de-
mocratic process itself. " This view of the First Amendment has existed
since the time of the Framers,2" and was developed into a political theory by
Alexander Meiklejohn 86 Modern proponents of deliberative democracy
similarly view the First Amendment as safeguarding and facilitating the
process of deliberation among citizens on matters of public importance."7
283. Id. at *9.
284. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Patronage and the First Amendment: A Structural Ap-
proach, 56 U. Ca. L. REv. 1369, 1384-85 (1989) ("This structural approach presumes that if
the political process remains untainted, then the sovereign people can be counted on to protect
their own freedoms.").
285. Id. at 1385 n.86 (citing authorities).
286. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 241-52
(1993) (advocating that First Amendment law should be reconceptualized to strengthen de-
mocratic deliberation by ensuring increased focus on public issues and by facilitating a
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The idea of the First Amendment's structural role in the political system
also dovetails with the political process theory of judicial review. In its
seminal footnote four in Carolene Products,"'8 the Warren Court signaled its
refusal to defer to legislation that restricted the political process or involved
prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities." '9 In what John Hart Ely
later described as the "representation-reinforcing" view of the judiciary,29
courts could exercise judicial review over speech restrictions that inhibited
full and meaningful participation in the political process."" In its broadest
form, political process theory suggests that democratic government cannot
flourish if the majority is able to suppress competing political views. 2
The Supreme Court has relied on a structural interpretation of free
speech in expanding the First Amendment beyond its traditional scope of
protecting against prior restraints. The Court has underscored the structural
role of the First Amendment in striking down restrictions on expression, ini-
tially in cases involving subversive speech 93 and later in cases involving
more indirect forms of censorship, such as the imposition of a licensing tax
on the owners of newspapers' and restrictions on the right to receive infor-
mation."' The Court's reformulation of libel law in matters involving public
officials was based on its commitment to the principle that "debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."296 Its recognition of the
First Amendment's broader political purpose helps explain its resistance to
restrictions on the receipt and dissemination of information in the courthouse
and on the press's ability to publish information about or obtained during
greater diversity of viewpoints).
288. United States v. Carolene Prods. Corp., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
289. Id.
290. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REvIEW (1980).
291. See id. at 93-94; see also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587
(1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Carolene Products for the proposition that the First
Amendment has "a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of
self-government"). Notably, Ely also maintained that courts should act to facilitate the repre-
sentation of noncitizens, who cannot vote in any state and who have been long subject to hos-
tility. See ELY, supra note 290, at 161-62.
292. See Michael J. Klarman, Symposium on Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later:
The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 747, 755 (1991).
293. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity es-
sential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional sys-
tem."); see also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
294. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1936) (stating that the First
Amendment protects not only against censorship but also "any action of the government by
means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems
absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights").
295. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (declaring unconstitutional deten-
tion of communist propaganda in the mails); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (declar-
ing unconstitutional prohibition on door-to-door distribution of literature).
296. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 37
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public trials.2' The informed public opinion engendered by a free press has
also been cited in a range of contexts, from providing a restraint on the ex-
ecutive branch's enormous power over national security policy298 to serving
as a basis for striking down restrictions on the legal decisions of govern-
ment-funded legal service lawyers.'" In addition, the Court has underscored
the First Amendment's related role of checking the abuse of power by offi-
cials.'
As previously noted, however, prior to Richmond Newspapers the Court
never saw the First Amendment's structural role as a basis for granting a
broad right of access to government records, documents, or facilities."' Ac-
cess to information possessed by the legislative or executive branches was
suggested to be a political question beyond the province of the judiciary. 2
Attempts to weave a broad constitutional right to know out of the cloth of
Meiklejohn's political theory of the First Amendment were limited to the
dissenting opinions of a few justices.' Moreover, since Richmond Newspa-
pers, the Court has adhered to the dichotomy between information within the
government's control and the receipt or dissemination of information, reas-
serting that restricting access to the former does not violate the First
Amendment.'
As we have also seen, the expansion of access rights in Richmond
297. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) ("The freedom of the
press to publish [official court records] appears to... be of critical importance to our type of
government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public busi-
ness."); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) ("'The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism."') (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
298. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-28 (1971) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) ("The Pentagon Papers Case").
299. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) ("It is fundamental that
the First Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people."') (quoting N.Y. Times, 376 U.S.
at 269).
300. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 273-76; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966)
(invalidating restrictions on press coverage of elections).
301. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
302. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (stating that the argument for a right
of access "invites the Court to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the
Constitution has left to the political process"); see also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester,
797 F.2d 1164, 1170 (3d Cir. 1986) (describing roots of view that access to executive branch
materials is a political question).
303. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(granting the press a preferred position in access to prison conditions would enable it to fulfill
its role in "'bring[ing] fulfillment to the public's right to know... which is crucial to the gov-
erning powers of the people"'); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850-62 (1974) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) (categorical interview ban would preclude active and effective reporting on
prison conditions, a matter that directly implicates "the societal function of the First Amend-
ment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs").
304. See L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999)
(upholding restrictions on access to arrest records).
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Newspapers and its progeny rested upon a mix of structural conceptions of
the First Amendment's role and the "complementary considerations" of his-
torical tradition and functional value.3 5 While the Court's approach is gener-
ally described in terms of the formalized two-pronged "logic" and "experi-
ence" test, it is not entirely clear that the Court ever intended this to always
be a rigid requirement. Certainly, a more reductionist approach has helped
enable lower courts to employ a more concrete, streamlined framework
when confronting the multitude of access questions that arose after Rich-
mond Newspapers.3" Yet, as discussed more fully below, an overly inflexi-
ble application of the "logic" and "experience" test, particularly an insistence
on a long, unbroken history of access, can undermine the broader structural
concerns embodied in the First Amendment, which assume a particular sali-
ence in the immigration context.
B. The Application of Richmond Newspapers to Deportation Hearings
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to apply Richmond Newspapers out-
side the context of criminal proceedings. While lower courts have applied
Richmond Newspapers to civil trials and to some administrative proceedings,
Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group represent the first time
any court has considered Richmond Newspapers' applicability to deportation
hearings.3" While they reached different outcomes, both the Sixth and Third
Circuits concluded that Richmond Newspapers furnished the proper test to
determine whether there is a First Amendment right of access to deportation
proceedings and rejected the government's argument that particular defer-
ence should be given to the Creppy Directive because it involves the gov-
ernment's exercise of its immigration power.
The principles underlying Richmond Newspapers and its extension by
lower courts beyond the criminal context strongly support its application to
deportation proceedings. As both circuit courts observed, deportation hear-
ings involve adjudicative, adversarial trial-type proceedings similar in criti-
305. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise
I1").
306. See, e.g., North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.J.
2002) (describing how "the considerations giving rise to the presumption of openness es-
poused in Richmond Newspapers have been distilled into a working standard"), rev'd on other
grounds, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cit. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
307. Prior to Richmond Newspapers, a district court had found a right of public access to
the deportation hearing of an individual alleged to have concealed his Nazi past based on the
power of openness to check abuse in a matter involving individual liberty. See Pechter v. Ly-
ons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the INS regulation setting forth
the presumptive openness of deportation hearings "is but one of countless manifestations of a
public policy centuries old that judicial proceedings, especially those in which the life or lib-
erty of an individual is at stake, should be subject to public scrutiny, not only for the protec-
tion of the individual from unwarranted and arbitrary conviction, but also to protect the public
from lax prosecution"). 39
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cal respects to criminal trials. 8 The functional and structural values de-
scribed by Chief Justice Burger in Richmond Newspapers-guaranteeing the
fairness of the proceedings,' providing the community with a therapeutic
outlet31° and educating the public 3"-are also aspects of deportation hearings.
In addition, deportation hearings, like criminal trials, involve an attempt by
the government to deprive individuals of their liberty in a coercive fashion.
While deportation is not considered criminal punishment, it nonetheless car-
ries severe consequences, potentially resulting "in the loss of all that makes
life worth living."3 '2 This principle-that liberty may not be taken away in a
closed proceeding-helped drive Richmond Newspapers."3 Indeed, it is dif-
ficult to imagine that such a sweeping celebration of the Anglo-American
legal tradition would have been made in discussing access to a commercial
dispute, regardless of the tradition of openness in such proceedings.
Furthermore, it is precisely the fact that deportation hearings are formal
adjudicative proceedings where liberty is at stake that distinguishes them
from the Court's pre-Richmond Newspapers access cases like Houchins.
Houchins did not involve access to a trial-type proceeding but rather to a
large public institution (a prison), with whose operation the Court was reluc-
tant to interfere.3"4 Indeed, if there were any relevance of Houchins to the de-
portation of the post-September 11 detainees, it would be on the question of
access to immigration detention centers, not to the deportation hearings
themselves. The main difference between Houchins and Richmond Newspa-
pers is not that one is "administrative" and the other "criminal," but rather
that in the latter the press and public sought access to a formal proceeding
where an individual's liberty was at stake, while in the former they at-
tempted to gather information about a large, government-run institution and
bureaucracy. Indeed, the Court's more recent discussion of Houchins sug-
gests that it remains limited to some types of information in the govern-
ment's control, and should not be extended to adjudicative proceedings.3 5
308. Cf. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (suggesting the applicability of Richmond Newspapers to adjudicative pro-
ceedings like deportation hearings as opposed to investigations), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041
(2004). Although the D.C. Circuit cited Detroit Free Press, it failed to note that the Third Cir-
cuit had also found Richmond Newspapers the appropriate framework to assess a First
Amendment right of access claim to deportation hearings. Id.
309. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980).
310. ld. at 571.
311. Id. at 572-73.
312. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).
313. 448 U.S. at 574 ('"The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence
has long been reflected in Anglo-American distrust for secret trials."') (quoting Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978).
315. Cf. L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999) (cit-
ing Houchins in support of restriction on access to arrest records, information in the govern-
ment's control). Although the question of a First Amendment right of access to the names of
the September 11 detainees is beyond the scope of this article, the fact that such arrests are
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For these reasons, recognizing a right of access to deportation proceed-
ings would not implicate the separation-of-powers concerns expressed in
Houchins. There the government acted in an administrative capacity,
whereas in deportation hearings it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, whose
main feature is adjudication, not bureaucratic management. Deportation
hearings are also distinct from grand jury proceedings," 6 which, while in-
volving individual liberty, are investigatory and not adjudicative in nature.3"7
Deportation hearings are governed by similar notions of due process as
criminal trials (even if less process is due), and their operation cannot, like
prison management, be deemed "a legislative task which the Constitution
has left to the political processes."3 '8 Rather, though labeled administrative,
deportation hearings are sufficiently similar to criminal trials in terms of the
nature of the proceedings and issues at stake to require the question of access
be analyzed in light of Richmond Newspapers, not pre-Richmond Newspa-
pers access decisions like Houchins. In addition, the extension of Richmond
Newspapers' principles to deportation hearings, with their almost unique
similarities to criminal trials, would alleviate the Court's concerns about ex-
tending Richmond Newspapers more broadly in the administrative setting
and unleashing a potentially endless stream of demands for government
documents, records, and operations.3
C. The First Amendment and a Constitutional Right ofAccess
to Deportation Hearings
Assuming Richmond Newspapers provides the appropriate framework
through which to analyze access to deportation hearings, the question re-
mains whether a constitutional right of access exists. This section describes
why the First Amendment's broader goals support a right of access to depor-
tation proceedings, particularly in the wake of September 11. It then ad-
dresses the relationship of those goals to Richmond Newspapers' limiting
principles of historical tradition and functional value.
functionally equivalent to criminal arrests suggests that this issue should also be analyzed un-
der Richmond Newspapers, not Houchins.
316. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also First Amendment Coalition
v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 472-73 (3d Cir. 1986) (comparing judicial
review and inquiry board to grand jury proceeding, rather than to criminal or civil trial).
317. Cf Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701-02; Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing "crucial distinction between
'investigatory information' and 'access to information relating to a governmental adjudicative
process"') (quoting Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 699), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
318. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12.
319. See, e.g., id. at 12-16; see also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164,
1172-73 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing the potentially broad scope of a claim of a right of access
to agency records).
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1. Deportation Hearings and the Structural Goals of the First Amendment
The events of September 11 have dramatically impacted public policy
and debate over a range of issues, including national security, foreign affairs,
immigration, and civil liberties. The government's imposition of sweeping
measures to combat terrorism has principally targeted immigrants, especially
men from Arab and Muslim nations, leading to detention without charges
and other abuses.32 In this context, deportation hearings serve a critical role
because they often represent the first and only opportunity for these immi-
grants to formally contest the allegations against them. The blanket closure
of deportation hearings in a category of cases-a category determined by the
executive branch without any judicial review-hides the adjudicative, out-
come-determinative component of this process from public view and pre-
vents the public from seeing how the war on terrorism is being waged. To
deny a right of access to such proceedings, without ever requiring the gov-
ernment to demonstrate an individualized justification, would undercut the
First Amendment's role in fostering informed public debate and checking
the abuse of government power. While national security may indeed justify
closure in individualized instances-a power previously granted to immigra-
tion judges under a general closure regulation32' and now more explicitly au-
thorized under an emergency interim regulation 322 -it does not support the
closure of hearings in an entire category of cases based upon the unreview-
able determination of executive branch officials.
By seeking to remove all information about the deportation process
from the public domain, the Creppy Directive effectively transforms a previ-
ously open adjudicative proceeding to determine an individual's right to re-
main in the country into another stage in a secret law enforcement investiga-
tion. It enables the government to conduct the entire sweep of law
enforcement operations, from investigation through adjudication and sanc-
tion, outside of public view. It effectively makes the deportation process into
an extension of the country's national security policy, as though the hearing
itself were a form of classified information.323 The war against terrorism thus
obliterates the line between law enforcement and adjudication in immigra-
tion law. In the process, the blanket closure rule curtails public awareness of
the government's attempt to deprive an individual of liberty through a trial-
type proceeding, grants unchecked power to law enforcement officials, lim-
320. See supra notes 1-5.
321. 8 C.F.R. § 3.27, redesignated as 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2003) (mandating the closure
of certain hearings, such as those involving abused alien children, and permitting the closure
of all other hearings to protect witnesses, parties, or the public interest).
322. 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799 (2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2003)) (authorizing
immigration judges to issue protective orders, accept documents under oath, and close pro-
ceedings where protected information may be discussed).
323. Cf generally Bruce E. Fein, Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and
Statutory Dimensions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1985).
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its the public's knowledge about the war against terrorism, and undermines
the sense of participation in the political process among targeted groups, in
this case Muslims and those of Arab descent.
The Court's understanding of the First Amendment's structural role in
Richmond Newspapers applies with equal force to deportation proceedings.
Like criminal trials and ancillary proceedings, open deportation hearings
serve a range of values, including guaranteeing the fairness of the proceed-
ings, providing a therapeutic outlet for transgression of the nation's immi-
gration laws, and educating the public about deportation proceedings them-
selves.32 ' Yet, in addition to these functional values, open deportation
hearings also promote informed public debate about enforcement of the
country's immigration laws, an important aspect of the war against terror-
ism. It is important to recognize that the government never disclosed the ex-
istence of its blanket closure policy and that many hearings were presumably
closed before the policy came to light and could be challenged in court.325
While the closure of individual hearings may be merited upon a proper
showing by the government (including a more particularized basis than a
boilerplate affidavit),326 the wholesale conduct of secret hearings to remove
individuals from the country violates the basic principles of an open democ-
racy secured by the First Amendment.
Under Richmond Newspapers, the First Amendment's primary role is
not to protect an individual's constitutional rights-a function served by the
Sixth Amendment-but rather to serve a larger social purpose. If, for exam-
ple, a long-term permanent resident is being detained and deported for an
immigration violation, it is a matter of public importance, just like the trial
of the defendants in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny. The principle
would apply whether the immigration violation was minor or substantial,
just as the public has a right of access to criminal trials whether they involve
misdemeanors or felonies. In each instance, a trial-type proceeding is em-
ployed to adjudicate the state's use of its coercive power to impose a sanc-
tion that deprives an individual of liberty.
The government's argument that its plenary power over immigration
supports a more deferential approach to its decision whether to allow access
324. Cf Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-73 (plurality opinion).
325. See Reply Brief of Petitioner in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, North
Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
2215 (2003).
326. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 707-10 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
the government's arguments for a blanket closure rule rather than consideration of the need
for closure on a case-by-case basis based on particularized findings; suggesting that the gov-
ernment could keep confidential and sensitive information from the public domain as the need
arose in individual cases); cf Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07
(1982) (holding that the attempt to deny a right of access to a portion of a criminal trial to in-
hibit disclosure of sensitive information must be necessitated by a compelling government
interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-
81 (requiring particularized findings to support closure, including consideration of less restric-
tive alternative means). 43
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to deportation hearings obscures the larger purpose of the First Amendment
and seeks to transform a question about free speech into one about immigra-
tion regulation. An important dispute in Detroit Free Press and North Jersey
Media Group was not simply between the government's power to regulate
immigration and the constitutional rights of individual immigrants. When
individuals, some of whom have lived in the United States for many years,
are arrested, detained, and placed in a formal adversarial proceeding to de-
termine their right to remain in this country, it implicates the interests not
only of those persons, but also of the general public. The interests of the
former may be rooted in notions of due process and equal protection,327 but
those of the latter are guaranteed by the First Amendment. While deportation
hearings may have an administrative label, the public's interest in preserving
access to such proceedings bears a strong resemblance to its interest in ac-
cess to criminal trials.
Moreover, it is precisely because of the government's extensive power
over substantive decisions governing immigration policy that the public
should have access to see how those policies are implemented.32 Congress
has broad powers as to which noncitizens to admit and to establish the
grounds for exclusion and deportation. Though these decisions might
amount to unlawful discrimination in another context, they are reviewed by
courts only for a rational basis.329 Similarly, while immigrants in deportation
proceedings possess due process rights33 and are constitutionally guaranteed
federal judicial review of deportation orders," those rights have traditionally
327. Indeed, one post-September 11 immigrant detainee, a plaintiff in the Detroit Free
Press litigation, also brought a separate Due Process challenge to his closed deportation pro-
ceedings. See supra note 211.
328. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the
argument for a constitutional right of access may be stronger where, as in prisons, there is a
vulnerable, otherwise unprotected segment of the population and a tradition of deference to
governmental policy). A similar understanding is reflected by the distinction, recognized by
the Sixth Circuit, between procedural and substantive immigration laws. See supra notes 222-
23 and accompanying text; see also Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976) ("We do
not dispute the power of Congress to create different standards of admission and deportation
for different groups of aliens. However, once those choices are made, individuals within a
particular group may not be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to
any governmental interest."). Courts also do not exercise the usual degree of deference to
immigration decisions when they raise separation of power concerns. See, e.g., INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (rejecting that "plenary authority over aliens" precludes
review of whether "Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implement-
ing that power"-in this case by establishing a one-House veto of the Attorney General's
grant of suspension of deportation).
329. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 (1977) (noting "limited judicial responsi-
bility" with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of
aliens); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be un-
acceptable if applied to citizens.").
330. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S.
86 (1903) ("The Japanese Immigrant Case").
331. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
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been considered against the background of the government's broad immigra-
tion powers. The First Amendment thus plays a particularly crucial role by
ensuring that when this power is exercised through a trial-type proceeding to
deprive an individual of liberty, that proceeding must remain open and sub-
ject to public scrutiny.332 Indeed, as the Court itself has previously stated, the
government's extraordinary power over immigration makes it even more
important that such power be administered "not arbitrarily and secretly, but
fairly and openly. 333 Although the Court in that case was referring specifi-
cally to the due process violation in deporting a noncitizen based on evi-
dence produced in absentia and not recorded or released to the deportee, the
principle that there needs to be some check on such extensive governmental
power-a point reinforced by the Court's recent decisions involving the in-
definite detention of noncitizens33 and judicial review of deportation orders
of criminal aliens 33 -applies equally to the First Amendment.
Although more modern scholarship discusses the First Amendment's
checking value in post-Watergate terms of preventing the abuse of power by
corrupt public officials3" and curbing the excesses of "big government,"
337
Madison and other Framers envisioned a broader role for the First Amend-
ment, as a way to check errors of judgment and illegal actions by govern-
ment officials.338 Madison emphasized that it was essential for the public to
have access to information about the government if a representative democ-
racy was to function properly. 339 He also believed it was critical that people
332. Cf. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (describing
effects of Creppy Directive as "uproot[ing] people's lives, outside the public eye, and behind
a closed door"); cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Non-Judicial Checks on Agency Actions, 49
ADMIN. L. REv. 193, 194 (1997) ("[T]raditionally, the courts have been wary of stepping into
the immigration area. Congress, well aware of such judicial hesitance, appears willing to
make the most of it.").
333. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920).
334. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
335. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). A number of commentators have observed that
decisions such as Zadvydas signaled a possible decline of the plenary power doctrine itself,
though also cautioning that September 11 could prompt its revival. E.g., Peter J. Spiro, Ex-
plaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEo. IMMIG. L.J. 339, 344, 357 (2002).
336. E.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 540-41. Blasi describes, for example, the checking
value's emphasis on information from "undisclosed, unverified sources." Id. at 603 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 731 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("A public-spirited person inside government, who is not implicated in any crime,
will now be fearful of revealing corruption or other governmental wrongdoing, because he
will now know he can subsequently be identified by use of compulsory process.").
337. Blasi also emphasized the need for well-organized, well-financed professional crit-
ics to scrutinize the activities of an increasingly large and complex government bureaucracy.
See Blasi, supra note 28, at 541.
338. THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 211 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973), cited in Blasi, supra note 28, at 535.
339. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE
MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("A popular Government without popular informa-
tion, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who mean to be their own Gover-
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retain the right to criticize government officials-a proposition that de-
pended on their being informed about the actions of those officials.' The
power to arrest, detain, and deport immigrants, all in secret, invites precisely
the type of abuse against which Madison and others cautioned. It helps pre-
vent any criticism of how the government is conducting the "war against ter-
rorism" and employing its vast power against immigrants, including many
long-time residents-a power the government itself points to as proof of its
progress. 4' Given law enforcement's targeting of Arab and Muslim commu-
nities after September I1 ,'2 its expanded power to detain and deport nonciti-
zens under the Patriot Act, 3 and the erosion of procedural rights,3 the First
Amendment's checking role assumes an even greater importance. It becomes
critical that the final stage of this law enforcement process-the formal ad-
judication of the right to remain in the country-remain open to the public.
Indeed, the argument for a constitutional right of access to the deportation
hearings that occurred in the wake of September 11 was in many ways closer
to the Framers' vision of the First Amendment as a check against abuse by
government officials than is a right of access to "sensational" criminal tri-
als.'
nors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."). At the same time,
Madison supported making the Constitutional Convention's deliberations confidential, sug-
gesting that the principle had limits based on context. I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 15-17 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
340. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627, 632 (1990) (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 434-36, 440-43 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789),
reprinted in 5 THE FOuNDERS' CONSTITUTION 141, 145 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987)); Capital Cites Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1183-84 (3d Cir. 1986)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("[T]he earliest and certainly the most widely-accepted explanation
of the animating purpose of the speech-press clause is that enunciated by its author, James
Madison; namely, its value in serving as a restraint upon the abuse of power by public offi-
cials."). This understanding of the checking value also forms the Freedom of Information
Act's core goal of agency disclosure. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) (members of the public have a
right to know "what their government is up to") (internal quotation marks omitted); Dep't of
Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) ("basic purpose of [Freedom Of Information Act
is] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny").
341. Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, Count of Released Detainees Is Hard to Pin Down,
WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2001, at A1O.
342. Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement, and Subordination: The Conse-
quences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1193-94 (2002).
343. See supra note 2; see also Cole, supra note 1, at 966-67 ("[The Patriot Act] makes
aliens deportable for wholly innocent associational activity with a 'terrorist organization,'
whether or not there is any connection between the alien's associational conduct and any act
of violence, much less terrorism.") (quoting USA PATRIOT Act, § 411, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001)); Cole, supra note 1, at 971 ("The [Patriot Act] gives the Attorney Gen-
eral unprecedented power to detain aliens without a hearing and without a showing that they
pose a threat to national security or a flight risk.").
344. See Ashar, supra note 342, at 1197-98.
345. Cf Kate Zernike, Everything Else but the Name, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, § 4, at 4
(discussing media lawyers' First Amendment arguments against a decorum order in opening
stages of rape trial of celebrated basketball star Kobe Bryant and noting the observation of a46
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Furthermore, any blanket closure rule like the Creppy Directive creates
a troubling dichotomy between noncitizen "special interest" cases and the
prosecution of terrorism-related offenses in criminal courts. In the wake of
September 11, the government has increasingly avoided combating terrorism
through traditional criminal law enforcement, relying instead on "softer-
spots" like immigration law, which provides increased maneuverability, lev-
erage, and judicial deference.3' From a First Amendment perspective, this
means a danger of greater secrecy and less public debate. A blanket closure
rule in deportation hearings thus provides an additional incentive for the
government to charge individuals with immigration violations in order to
wage the war against terrorism beneath the radar and outside the public eye.
In addition, the question of access to deportation hearings has a particu-
larly significant impact on this country's various immigrant communities.
The secret deportation proceedings of the September 11 detainees focused
almost exclusively on adult males from Arab or Muslim countries and had
wide reverberations in Arab and Muslim communities throughout the coun-
try, as the case of Rabih Haddad, the individual facing deportation in Detroit
Free Press, demonstrates. Haddad, a locally prominent Muslim cleric, was
living with his family in Ann Arbor, Michigan.' He was the co-founder of
the second-largest U.S.-based Islamic aid organization and also served as a
leading fund-raiser for mosques in the Ann Arbor area?" He was arrested
and detained by the INS in December 2001 on a minor immigration visa vio-
lation,3"9 and placed in removal hearings. Until it was enjoined by the district
court, the government attempted to conduct in secret all of Haddad's immi-
gration proceedings, including his bail and deportation hearings.3
Haddad's treatment engendered substantial opposition among the Mus-
lim-American community and prompted a federal lawsuit by media organi-
zations, joined by the district's federal congressional representative."' As a
professor of culture and communications that "[t]his is not what our founders were talking
about when they were talking about the First Amendment.... The First Amendment was
supposed to make the government vulnerable to constant oversight by a vigorous press").
346. A similar but more dramatic dynamic helps explain the government's increasing use
of the "enemy combatant" designation to remove individuals, citizens and noncitizens alike,
from the criminal process and subject them to military detention, where it opposes not only
access to the press but also to counsel, and possibly a military trial that would be closed to the
public. See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
1353 (2004); see also Erich Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: Terror; U.S. Cites Al Qaeda
in Plot to Destroy Brooklyn Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at Al (noting examples of
individuals threatened with the "enemy combatant" designation to pressure them to plead
guilty to criminal charges).
347. See Dan Eggen & Kari Lydersen, In Michigan, Anti-Terrorism Effort Goes Public:
Haddad Case Forces Rare Glimpse of Secret U.S. Campaign, WASH. POST, May 6, 2002, at
A3.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941-42 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
351. Id. 47
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result, Haddad's case attracted national attention. The government never
supplied any particularized evidence to justify the closure of his deportation
proceedings,352 nor was Haddad ever charged with any terrorist crime.53
Rather, Haddad was ultimately deported based on a routine immigration vio-
lation (overstaying his visa) and then denied asylum and other relief.3  Like
hundreds of other September 11 detainees, Haddad's case demonstrates how
the deportation process can become a matter of significant concern to large
segments of the population, particularly members of the United States' siz-
able Muslim and Arab communities.' As with any other ethnic or religious
group, maintaining an open adjudicative process is critical to these commu-
nities' faith in the institutions on which the success of a pluralistic democ-
racy like the United States depends. The negative impact of closed proceed-
ings on the participation of such groups in larger society further
demonstrates the structural importance of access rights in this context.
2. Another Look at the "Experience" and "Logic" Test
This section reexamines Richmond Newspapers' "logic" and "experi-
ence" test. It looks critically at the Court's reliance on history in Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny, and then explains why this prong should be ap-
plied more flexibly in light of the First Amendment's broader structural
goals. It next briefly examines Richmond Newspapers' "logic" or function
prong in light of its application to deportation proceedings.
a. History and the Tradition of Openness
Although the Court's post-Richmond Newspapers right of access deci-
sions suggest that varying lengths of openness can satisfy the so-called "ex-
perience" prong,356 the Court has never entirely dispensed with the history
352. Danny Hakim, Transcripts Offer First Look at Secret Federal Hearings, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2002, at A15 (noting that based on newly opened records, the main suspicion
against Haddad involves his prior travel to Pakistan as part of his humanitarian work).
353. In re Haddad, 27 Immig. Rptr. B1-47 (2003). Indeed, virtually none of the Septem-
ber 11 detainees were charged with any crime relating to terrorism. See, e.g., Curt Anderson,
Most of the Post-September 11 Detainees Deported, Released or Guilty of Nonterror Of-
fenses, AssocIATED PRESS, Dec. 11, 2002, http:Hcustomwire.ap.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2004)
(on file with author).
354. In re Haddad, 27 Immig. Rptr. B1-47 (2003).
355. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2002) ("It is
important for the public, particularly individuals who feel that they are being targeted by the
Government as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, to know that even during
these sensitive times the Government is adhering to immigration procedures and respecting
individuals' rights. Openness is necessary for the public to maintain confidence in the value
and soundness of the Government's actions, as secrecy only breeds suspicion as to why the
Government is proceeding against Haddad and aliens like him.").
356. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise
IF'); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise
F'); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).
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requirement or found that evidence of functional value could alone support a
constitutional right of access. At the same time, the Court has never explic-
itly stated that a lengthy tradition of openness is essential to a right of access
in all circumstances.
Requiring some tradition of openness has appealed to the Court because
it seems to invoke objectivity and judicial restraint, offering the promise of a
principled limit on the Court's power to fashion new First Amendment rights
out of the fabric of constitutional structure. Yet, making a constitutional
right of access turn on this type of historical analysis potentially raises a
number of difficult issues.
While evidence of a long tradition of openness appeared to provide the
basis in Richmond Newspapers for distinguishing criminal trials from other
forms of government-controlled information, documents, and facilities high-
lighted in cases such as Houchins, 5' the Court never clearly articulated the
principle underlying this distinction. Neither Chief Justice Burger nor Justice
Brennan persuasively related the descriptive fact of a tradition of open
criminal trials to an underlying theory of the First Amendment.358 As Justice
Stevens noted, the absence of a tradition of access, as in the prison context,
should make the need for access more, not less, compelling in terms of the
First Amendment's structural purpose in promoting informed public debate
and checking the abuse of government power.359
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers never
explicitly links history to what he describes as the First Amendment's guar-
antee of the freedom of communication on matters relating to the function-
ing of government.3" Nor does it describe why the functional value of open-
ness depends upon the existence of a long tradition of access.36' Indeed, the
actual reasons underlying a tradition of openness may sometimes be more a
matter of circumstance than design. In Press-Enterprise I, for example,
Chief Justice Burger observed that at common law the presence of bystand-
ers helped ensure a supply of potential additional jurors if challenges kept a
sufficient number of qualified jurors from appearing at the trial 362-hardly
357. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 n.11 (1980); cf. id. at 583
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the apparent inconsistency between the Court's decisions in
Richmond Newspapers and prison right of access cases such as Houchins); Cox, supra note
98, at 22 (discussing the inconsistent treatment of the prison right of access cases in Richmond
Newspapers).
358. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 168, at 325 (criticizing Chief Justice Burger's ap-
proach for its lack of coherence).
359. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
360. See BeVier, supra note 168, at 325-26 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
575). Nor, as Professor BeVier observed, does Chief Justice Burger's opinion explain why a
tradition of historical practice is linked to a constitutional mandate of openness under the First
Amendment, but merely evidence of "a common-law rule" under the Sixth Amendment, as it
had been in Gannett Newspapers. See id. (quoting Gannett Newspapers Co. v. Depasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979)).
361. See id.
362. 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984). 49
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the purpose open voir dire hearings can be said to serve today under Rich-
mond Newspapers. At the same time, other stages of criminal proceedings
such as pretrial hearings may not boast such a long history of openness-the
Court dated public access to such proceedings to around the mid-nineteenth
century3 63 -but have increased so much in importance over time that denying
access would be tantamount to denying access to a trial itself.3"'
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers simi-
larly fails to explain conclusively how a tradition of openness is related to
the First Amendment's underlying purpose of preserving representative self-
government-4he structural goal he otherwise relies upon so heavily.' Al-
though Justice Brennan describes a tradition of openness as implying "the
favorable judgment of experience,"3" he does not explain why the absence of
such tradition necessarily signaled the incompatibility of access rights with
the broader goals of the First Amendment. Instead, Justice Brennan refers-
presumably prudentially-to history, along with functional value, as a bul-
wark against the "theoretically endless" expansion of a constitutional right of
access.
367
Yet, history may provide limited guidance because those historical tra-
ditions may themselves be indeterminate.368 The Court, for example, has
never said precisely how long the tradition of openness must be, though its
decision in Press-Enterprise 11 strongly suggests that a common law tradi-
tion of openness need not be established. Similarly, the Court has not indi-
cated whether the tradition of openness must be completely unbroken and
uniform, or whether a different standard might apply when the specific pro-
ceeding in issue-in this case, a deportation hearing-is itself of much more
recent origin than criminal trials.3' This imprecision gives lower courts little
363. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
364. See Hayes, supra note 165, at 1132; see also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester,
797 F.2d 1164, 1186-87 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (describing how refusing ac-
cess to information in the possession of public officials can represent the "ultimate prior re-
straint of imposed ignorance about [the government's] affairs").
365. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 588.
368. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1057, 1087 (1990).
369. In fact, historical evidence suggests that formal court proceedings in early ana-
logues to deportation, such as appeals of orders removing transient indigents from communi-
ties under the poor laws, were historically open to the public. See R. v. Hartfield, 90 Eng.
Rep. 733 (K.B. 1692) (right of poor person to appeal removal order to Quarter Sessions);
THOMAS SKYRME, HISTORY OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 202 (2d ed. 1994) (proceedings
before justices of the peace at the Quarter Sessions open to the public); see also Gerald Neu-
man, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLuM. L. REv. 1833,
1846-59 (1993) (discussing nineteenth century analogues to deportation). While most such
removal disputes under the poor laws centered on suits between towns over obligations to
support the poor rather than challenges by the individuals facing removal, see R. CRANSTON,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 23-24 (1995), the inter-town litigation was also
conducted in open court, suggesting the public nature of decisions about membership in the
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guidance and can lead to widely varying results or to attempts to avoid the
history prong or the "logic" and "experience" test altogether."'
In North Jersey Media Group, for example, the court noted that while it
had never framed a bright-line test for determining when a historical tradi-
tion of openness was lengthy enough to support a right of access, circuit
precedents suggest "that a more than one hundred year history of openness is
sufficient."37' The court arrived at this conclusion through a rough process of
induction based on the length of a tradition of openness in four cases,
37 2
which not only involved different issues and concerns, but do not uniformly
support the proposition for which they were cited in North Jersey Media
Group.17 3 The court never explained why a "hundred year minimum" was the
appropriate length of time, nor considered why, depending on the other fac-
tors involved, a lesser (or greater) period might be justified.
Furthermore, this type of historical inquiry cuts against the Court's prac-
tice of interpreting the First Amendment in light of current values and condi-
tions-an approach that has enabled First Amendment law to develop be-
yond its early scope of preventing prior restraints on speech or publication.
3 4
community. Cf JOSIAH H. BENTON, WARNING OUT IN NEW ENGLAND, 1656-1817, at 18, 38-39
(1911) (discussing practice of applying for "settlement," or legal residence, at public town
meetings); RuTH W. HERNDON, UNWELCOME AMERICANS: LIVING ON THE MARGIN IN EARLY
NEW ENGLAND 23 (2001) (examinations to enforce settlement laws held at town meetings and
recorded in town records); D.L. Jones, The Transformation of the Law of Poverty in Eight-
eenth Century Massachusetts, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1630-1800, at 175-76
(1984) (application for membership in Massachusetts towns decided at public town meeting).
370. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
371. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 222 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
372. See id. The cases cited are: Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland,
193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994); United
States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985); and Publicker Indus., Inc., v. Cohen, 733 F.2d
1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
373. Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 180-81 (rejecting a First Amendment claim of a right
to videotape a town planning commission meeting, but also finding that such meetings are
"precisely the type of public proceeding to which the First Amendment guarantees a public
right of access" notwithstanding the evidence of a relatively recent tradition of access);
Simone, 14 F.3d at 837-41 (finding a First Amendment right of access to post-trial proceed-
ings to investigate juror misconduct; relying primarily on Richmond Newspapers' "logic"
prong because the evidence of a tradition of access to this type of post-trial proceeding dated
no earlier than 1980 and provided "little guidance"); Smith, 776 F.2d at 1111-12 (finding a
First Amendment right of access to bills of particulars despite their "brief history" because of
their close analogy to indictments, which have traditionally been public). Only in Publicker
Industries, which involved access to civil trials, did the court directly base the First Amend-
ment right upon a tradition of access that dated back one hundred years or more. 733 F.2d at
1067-69.
374. See BeVier, supra note 168, at 328 n. 115; see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(193 1) (rejecting that the First Amendment protects only the prevention of prior restraints on
speech and publication); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (describing the Court's
long rejection of a "narrow, literal conception" of the First Amendment's terms); cf Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941) ("No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was
clearer than that of securing for the people of the United States much greater freedom of relig-
ion, expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed."). 51
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It also seems to conflict with the Court's approach to historical evidence in-
volving administrative agencies, as demonstrated in its recent decision in
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority
("Ports Authority").375 In Ports Authority, the Court held that state sovereign
immunity bars an administrative agency from adjudicating a private party's
complaint against a non-consenting state."" While Ports Authority recog-
nized that formalized administrative adjudications essentially did not exist
during the Framers' time, it nonetheless found that state sovereign immunity
applied to administrative proceedings because the particular proceeding was
almost functionally indistinguishable from a civil lawsuit."'
Similarly, in Seventh Amendment cases the Court has never adopted a
strict historical interpretation, which would have limited the right to a jury
trial to those actions at common law recognized by the English courts of
1791.378 Rather, the Court has looked to the common law of 1791 for guid-
ance, while holding the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee applica-
ble "if the new action involves the rights and remedies traditionally en-
forced" at common law." This more functionally oriented approach to
history suggests that the present focus should be principally on the nature of
deportation proceedings themselves, particularly their close analogy to
criminal proceedings.
There also may be other ways of looking at history that do not fall under
Richmond Newspapers' "logic" and "experience" test, but that are more
closely related to underlying theories of the First Amendment. Rather than
focus solely on the length of time deportation hearings have been open to the
public-an issue upon which two circuit courts have recently divided38"-the
First Amendment analysis should also acknowledge other historical evi-
dence, such as the mistreatment of immigrants during various periods of
American history. Since the late eighteenth century, the government has
consistently curtailed immigrants' rights during periods of war or insecurity,
375. 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002).
376. Id. at 769.
377. Id. at 755-60; cf. Capital Cities Media v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1190 n.12 (3d Cir.
1986) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (rejecting attempt to base access to agency records on exis-
tence of "functional analogue" of access to those records dating back to colonial times; em-
phasizing that "[miany if not most governmental agencies and activities of the Twentieth
Century did not exist at that time or for 100 years thereafter" and that "this country has ex-
perienced an enormous growth in governmental activity over the past 250 years").
378. Paul K. Sun, Note, Congressional Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to Federal
Agencies and the Right to Trial by Jury, 1988 DuKE L.J. 539, 542.
379. Id. (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1974)).
380. Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002)
("[D]eportation proceedings historically have been open. Although exceptions may have been
allowed, the general policy has been one of openness."), with North Jersey Media Group v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting evidence that "in practice, deportation
hearings have frequently been closed to the general public"), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215
(2003).
[Vol. 40
52
California Western Law Review, Vol. 40 [2003], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol40/iss2/3
2004] THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS 317
such as the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s,3 11 the Palmer Raids and
Red Scare following World War 1,3"2 the internment of over 120,000 Japa-
nese Americans (a majority of whom were U.S. citizens) during World War
II,383 and the deportation and exclusion of aliens on ideological grounds dur-
ing the Cold War.38 These measures have been repudiated with the passage
of time,383 and serve as stark reminders of democracy's limitations in protect-
ing individual rights in times of fear and uncertainty. Numerous commenta-
tors have already observed the parallels between these past reactions and the
country's response to terrorism after September 112.36 While the First
Amendment should not be transformed into a vehicle for asserting individual
rights or substantive limitations on the government's power to regulate im-
migration, its structural role in promoting informed public debate and check-
ing the abuse of power should be considered against the background of this
history. This role is at its zenith when the government seeks to deprive an
individual of liberty in a trial-type proceeding because of the public's inter-
381. Alien Enemy Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 21-24) (authorizing detention and removal of alien enemies during times of de-
clared war); Sedition Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800) (permitting
executive to deport "all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the
United States").
382. The Palmer Raids were a series of mass arrests conducted under the direction of
U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, leading to the deportation of alleged subversives.
Many of those deported were active in labor organizations, and it was never established that
any of those deported were terrorists. See generally EDWIN P. HOYT, THE PALMER RAIDS
1919-20: AN ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS DISSENT (1969); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND
DISSENTERS 208-37 (1963). By the early 1920s, the anti-radicalism and xenophobia that trig-
gered the Palmer Raids helped give rise to the racially discriminatory national origins immi-
gration quotas of the early 1920s. See Irene Scharf, Tired of your Masses: A History of and
Judicial Responses to Early 20th Century Anti-Immigrant Legislation, 21 RAW. L. REV. 131,
144-46 (1999).
383. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment program).
384. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, The Immigration Reform Act, and
Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Nonciti-
zens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 856 (1997).
385. For example, the United States has formally apologized to the former prisoners in-
terned during World War II and their families, while Congress has attempted to make repara-
tions. See, e.g., PAUL BOYER ET AL., THE ENDURING VISION, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 886-87 (1996); 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989b-4 (1988) (authorizing payment of repara-
tions); GEORGE MILLER, COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, 102D CONG., PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 88-92 (Comm. Print 1992) (concluding
that the internment was not justified by military necessity); Korematsu v. United States, 584
F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (overturning the criminal conviction of Fred Korematsu).
Later considerations of the Palmer Raids have been similarly harsh. See Cole, supra note 278
('The Palmer raids are now viewed as a tragic mistake, another in a long line of government
overreactions in times of crisis.").
386. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Juris-
prudence of Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 1087-88 & n.791 (2002); Susan
M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, "Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States in
U.S. Immigration Policy": Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11,
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 298-99
(2002). 53
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est in knowing and observing this use of government power. This is not to
say history is irrelevant in determining whether there is a constitutional right
of access under Richmond Newspapers, but rather that historical evidence of
openness must be read against the background of the structural concerns that
underlie the First Amendment.
b. Constitutional Structure and Functional Value
The "logic" prong has understandably not generated the same degree of
criticism as the "experience" prong. The Court has consistently found that
openness serves an important functional value in terms of the particular pro-
ceeding in question. To begin with, the Court's description of the functional
value of open criminal trials seems to incorporate both functional and struc-
tural concerns and examines openness in terms relevant to the First Amend-
ment's broader goals.
Like criminal trials, deportation hearings, which involve fact-finding
and law-making (albeit by an administrative agency), are a matter of public
concern. Access would promote both fairness and the perception of fairness.
It would also serve an educative function and act as a check on abuse of
power by executive branch officials. As in criminal proceedings, the press
can "bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the admini-
stration of justice.""3 7
Both the Sixth and Third Circuits recognized the value of open deporta-
tion hearings. The Third Circuit, however, concluded that open hearings
were not, on balance, beneficial after considering the negative effects of ac-
cess in terrorism-related cases. While Richmond Newspapers requires courts
to consider the negative effects of access, it also requires that they examine
the proceeding generally and not just the particular type of proceeding-in
other words, deportation hearings generally, rather than just "special inter-
est" deportation cases-in determining the threshold issue of whether a First
Amendment right of access exists. Moreover, the recent report by the Office
of the Inspector General.8 undermines the Third Circuit's description of the
dangers of access and confirms the need for case-by case review requiring
the government to provide a particularized basis for closure. Ultimately, ac-
cess to these formal, trial-type proceedings has a functional value very simi-
lar to the well-recognized value of access to criminal trials and satisfies the
concerns embodied in Richmond Newspapers' "logic" prong.389
387. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
388. See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text.
389. Structural importance and functional value do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. In
some instances access could undermine the functioning of the proceeding and yet still pro-
mote the structural goals of facilitating informed public debate and checking abuses of power.
Grand jury proceedings, which depend on secrecy, provide one such example where openness
would undermine their functional value, but still serve a structural purpose of the First
Amendment in enhancing public knowledge and debate. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise IF').
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V. CONCLUSION
The government's attempt to close an entire category of deportation
hearings without any particularized findings raises fundamental questions
about Richmond Newspapers and the role of the First Amendment in fulfill-
ing its historic functions of promoting informed public debate and checking
the abuse of government power. While deportation hearings cannot boast the
thousand-year history of openness like criminal trials, in many respects they
implicate the First Amendment's structural goals even more than criminal
trials. Indeed, the government's otherwise extensive powers over immigra-
tion suggest that when it seeks to deprive an individual of liberty through
formal, adjudicatory proceedings like deportation hearings, the public and
press should be guaranteed a constitutional right of access. The question of
access rights remains important not only in light of the hundreds of closed
hearings conducted in the wake of September 11, but also in terms of the
government's potential response to terrorist attacks in the future.
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